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DUTY OF MEMBER OF PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE TO DisCLOSE INFORMATION
BEFORE PURCHASING STOCK FROM NoN-DEPosITOR*
PLAINTIFF was a stockholder in a close corporation of which the defendant
was a director, executive vice-president, and general manager. I The de-
fendant received an offer from outside business men to buy a prosperous
subsidiary of the corporation for $15,000,000,2 or a part thereof on the
basis of this price.3 Negotiations were conducted by the defendant which
resulted in a plan for the reorganization of the subsidiary under which the
outside investors would acquire a four-fifteenths interest in the subsidiary
for $4,000,000.4 To effect this reorganization a deposit agreement was
drawn up. The parties to this agreement were to be the stbckholders of
the parent company, the stockholders of the subsidiary, and a deposit com-
mittee of which the defendant was a member.5 A few days after he had
signed the agreement, the defendant, with the assistance of third parties who
concealed his identity, purchased stock of the plaintiff who, at the time of
the sale, had no knowledge of the deposit agreement or of the contemplated
reorganization. Five years later, having found out that it was the defendant
who had bought her stock, the plaintiff brought suit to recover the amount
by which the actual value of the stock at the time of the sale exceeded the
price at which she had sold. The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff
*Nichol v. Sensenbrenner, 220 Wis. 165, 263 N. XV. 650 (1935).
1. The corporation, the Kimberly-Clark Company, had only fifty-four stockholders,
most of whom lived within a radius of twenty-five miles of the home office in Wisconsin
and were connected with the management. The stock of the corporation w-as not listed
on an exchange.
2. The subsidiary, the Kotex Company, had 3000 shares of stock outstanding of
which the parent company owned 2685. The remaining 315 shares were owned by six
individuals, all connected with the parent company. Although the value of the parent's
interest in the subsidiary was carried on the books a: only $263,500. the profits of the
subsidiary for the years 1924, 1925, and 1926, amounted to '2,599,912.19. The earnings
of the subsidiary were not shown on the books of the parent company nor was any
information in regard to these earnings given to the plaintiff or other stocktolders of
the parent company.
3. It is interesting to note that the acceptance or rejection of such an important
offer lay almost entirely -vAthin the discretion of a single individual, the defendant.
4. The alleged purpose of the reorganization plan was to avoid payment of an
income tax. See Sage v. Commissioner of Intenal Revenue, 83 F. (2d) 221 (C.C.A.
2d. 1936); Brief for Respondent 23, Nichol v. Sensenbrenner, 220 Wis. 165, 263 N. AV.
650 (1935) ; cf. Comment (1935) 45 Y.LE L. J. 134.
5. Under the reorganization plan the parent corporation was to declare a dividend
of the stock which it held in the subsidiary. This stock was to be delivered to the
deposit committee and exchanged by them for preferred and common stock in the new,
reorganized Kote.x Company. The deposit committee was also authorized to provide
for the issuance in the new company of not more than $4,000,000 of second preferred
stock with a provision to make it convertible into common stock.
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on the ground that the defendant, as a director and officer of the corpora-
tion, owed a duty of affirmative good faith towards the plaintiff when pur-
chasing her stock.6 On appeal the judgment was affirmed, 7 the court holding,
however, that "under the special circumstances here existing, the deposit
agreement created a trust relationship between the members of the com-
mittee of which defendant was a member and all the stockholders of the
Kotex Company and the Kimberly-Clark Company," and that the defendant,
therefore, was under a duty to disclose to the plaintiff all the material facts
relating to the reorganization plan before purchasing her stock.
8
The courts, partly because of differences in the deposit agreements in-
volved in individual cases, have shown a striking lack of unanimity in their
attempts to define the precise relationship between members of protective
committees and security holders who have either deposited or in some other
way become parties to the deposit agreements.0 Thus, in various situations,
the relationship has been defined as one of agency,
0 assignment,1 ' bailment,12
power coupled with an interest,'3 or trust 14. Despite their disagreement as to
6. In its opinion the trial court stated "that a director and principal officer of a
corporation, having an intimate knowledge of facts bearing directly upon the value of
its stock, cannot purchase the stock of another stockholder known to be ignorant of
such facts and by active concealment of such facts take an unfair advantage of such
ignorance, but that he owes to such stockholder the active duty of making an honest
disclosure of such facts materially affecting the value of the stock which he is trying
to buy." See Nichol v. Sensenbrenner, 220 Wis. 165, 168, 263 N.W. 650, 651 (1935).
7. The judgment of the trial court was also modified in that the plaintiff was
allowed interest from the date of the sale, November 6, 1926, rather than, as the trial
court had held, from the date of the verdict which was rendered June 29, 1934.
8. Nichol v. Sensenbrenner, 220 Wis. 165, 181, 263 N. W. 650, 656 (1935). One con-
ceivable interpretation of the case is that it held the defendant's membership on the
deposit committee to be only one of the "special circumstances" which resulted in a
trust relationship arising between the defendant as an officer-director of the corporation
and the plaintiff stockholder. Cf. Comment on principal case in (1936) 11 Wis. L.
REv. 547. Such an interpretation, however, would do violence to the precise words of
the court's holding quoted above.
9. See generally 15 FLErCHER, CoRPoRATioNs (Perm. ed. 1932) §7248; Carey and
Brabner-Smith, Studies in Realty Mortgage Foreclosures (1933) 28 ILL L. REV. 1;
Douglas, Protective Committees in Railroad Reorganizations (1934) 47 HAv. L.
REv. 565; Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganization (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 923;
Rodgers, Rights and Duties of the Committee in Bondholders' Reorganizations (1929)
42 HARv. L.- REv. 899; Rohrlich, Protective Committees (1932) 80 U. oF PA. L. REV.
670.
10. See Industrial & General Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, 180 N. Y. 215, 230, 73 N. E. 7,
11 (1905); Miller v. Dodge, 28 Misc. 640, 643, 59 N. Y. Supp. 1070, 1072 (Sup. Ct.,
1899).
11. Mines Management Co. v. Close, 186 App. Div. 23, 174 N. Y. Supp. 80 (1st
Dep't, 1919).
12. See Industrial & General Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, 180 N. Y. 215, 230, 73 N. E. 7,
11 (1905).
13. Unger v. Newlin Haines Co., 94 N. J. Eq. 458, 120 Atl. 331 (1923).
14. Bullard v. Cisco, 290 U. S. 179 (1933); United Waterworks Co. v. Stone, 127
Fed. 587 (C.C.D. Mass. 1904); Cushman v. Bonfield, 139 Ill. 219, 28 N. E. 937 (1891) ;
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terminology, however, courts are generally agreed that members of pro-
tective committees are fiduciaries, 1' at least as far as depositors are con-
cerned.16
The principal case, however, goes further than previous cases in deciding
that under special circumstances a committee member may owe fiduciary
obligations to a security holder who does not even know that the com-
mittee exists. In terms of technical trust relationships the imposition of
such a duty may be difficult, . for the non-depositor has entrusted nothing
to the committee member; there is no res upon which the trust may operate.
This lack of conformity to the typical trust concept is not decisive, however,
since fiduciary relationships are discovered far outside the technical boun-
daries of trust doctrine, and protective committees are in a position, by virtue
of their power over deposited securities, to affect drastically the rights of
non-depositors. 17 The technical weakness of the fiduciary argument, more-
over, was alleviated to a considerable extent in the instant case by the
unusual combination of facts surrounding the transaction: the terms of the
planned reorganization, including the anticipated sale, the purposeful con-
cealment, and especially the fact that the defendant committee member was
also an officer-director of the corporation and, for that reason, was probably
under a discrete.fiduciary obligation to the individual stockholders: It may
have been the cumulative effect of all these elements and not alone the cir-
cumstances of the reorganization plan, which moved the court in the Sen-
senbrenner case to impose fiduciary consequences upon the relation between
the protective committee member and the non-depositor. Thus the case
might be regarded as an application of the so-called "special circumstance"
doctrine which has acquired considerable significance in the field of law
involving the relationship between officers and directors of corporations and
their stockholders.- s It has there been held by courts which had not adopted
Cowell v. City Water Supply Co., 130 Iowa 671, 105 N. NV. 1016 (1906); American
Trust Co. v. Holtsinger, 226 Mass. 30, 114 N. E. 956 (1917) ; Monticello Bldg. Corp.
v. Monticello Inv. Co., 330 Mo. 1128, 52 S. NV. (2d) 545 (1932); Cassagne v. Marvin,
143 N. Y. 292, 38 N. E. 235 (1894); Bray v. Jones, 190 Ws. 578, 209 N. V. 675
(1926); cf. Peoria & E. Ry. Co. v. Coster, 97 Fed. 519 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899).
15. Parker v. New England Oil Corp., 13 F. (2d) 158 (D.Mass. 1926), rc'd on
other grounds, 19 F. (2d) 903 (C. C. A. 1st, 1927); Carter v. Nat. Bank of Poca-
hontas, 128 Md. 581, 98 AUt. 77 (1916); Cox v. Stokes, 156 N.Y. 491, 51 N.E. 316
(1898); Mawhinney v. Converse, 117 App. Div. 255, 102 N.Y. Supp. 279 (1st Dep't
1907); Clinton Trust Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon Street Corp., 237 App. Div. 789, 263
N.Y. Supp. 359 (2d Dep't 1933) ; Bergelt v. Roberts, 144 Misc. 832, 258 N.Y. Supp. 905
(Sup. Ct. 1932), afftd, 236 App. Div. 777, 258 N.Y. Supp. 1086 (Ist Depot 1932);
cf. Robertson v. First Nat. Bank, 35 Idaho 363, 206 Pac. 6S9 (1922).
16. Cf. Bound v. South Carolina R. Co., 78 Fed. 49 (C.C.A. 4th, 1897).
17. S. E. C., REPoR on THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATIO OF THE WoRN, AcrivnxEs,
PERSONNEL AND FuNCTIoNs OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION Co=IrSs (1936)
Part IV, at 98-102, Part VI, at 205-214. Moreover, as in the principal case, trading
on the basis of inside information may be consummated before the deposit agreements
are made known to the security holders. S. E. C., supra, Part III, at 135.
18. See generally Berle, Publicity of Accounts and Directors" Purchases of Stoch
(1927) 25 Mica. L. REV. 827; Laylin, The Duty of a Director Purchasing Shares of
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the full fiduciary rule,' 9 and yet which did not like to see corporate officials
unfairly profit by the use of inside information 2 0 that special circumstances
within the peculiar knowledge of directors, such as prospective mergers,
'2 1
assured sales of corporate assets 2 2 agreements with third parties to buy the
stock at a higher price,2 3 and the impending declaration of dividends, 24 give
rise to a fiduciary relationship between the officers of a corporation and
individual stockholders.2 Whether or not liability in the principal case
Stock (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 731; Smith, Purchase of Shares of a Corporation by a
Director from a Shareholder (1921) 19 Mxcn. L. REv. 698; Walker, The Duty of
Disclosure by a Director Purchasing Stock from his Stockholders (1923) 32 YALE
L. J. 637; Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Share-
holder (1910) 8 MICH. L. REv. 267.
19. For cases supporting the view that there is always a fiduciary relationship exist-
ing between corporate officials and individual stockholders insofar as the latters' stock
is concerned, see Westwood v. Continental Can Co., 80 F. (2d) 494 (C.C.A. 5th, 1935) ;
Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1903); Wood v. MacLean Drug Co.,
266 Iil. App. 5 (1932); Dawson v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N. W. 929
(1916); Stewart v. Harris, 69 Kan. 498, 77 Pac. 277 (1904); Jacquith v. Mason,
99 Neb. 509, 156 N. W. 1041 (1916); Saville v. Sweet, 234 App. Div. 236, 254 N. Y.
Supp. 768 (lst Dep't, 1932).
20. The older view is that an officer may deal with an individual stockholder as
with a stranger. Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 581 (N.Y. 1868) ; Tippecanoe County
v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 15 Am. Rep. 245 (1873); 3 FLETCHER, Op. cit. supra note 9,
§1168; Note (1933) 84 A. L. R. 615. Consequently, when purchasing stock, the officer
is under no duty to disclose information which he possesses as to the value of the
stock. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N. E. 659 (1933) (ore discovery);
Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N. J. Law 656, 23 Atl. 426 (1891) (sale of corporate property) ;
Connolly v. Shannon, 105 N. J. Eq. 155, 147 Atl. 234 (1929) (prospective merger).
21. McMynn v. Richardson-Phenix Co., 186 Wis. 442, 201 N. W. 272 (1924),
noted in (1925) 10 CORN. L. Q. 509.
22. Gammon v. Dain, 238 Mich. 30, 212 N. W. 957 (1927); cf. Commonwealth
Title Ins. & T. Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77 (1910).
23. Stanton v. Hample, 272 Fed. 424 (C.C.A. 9th, 1921); cf. Dunnett v. Am, 71
F. (2d) 912 (C.C.A. 10th, 1934), noted in (1934) 20 CORN. L. Q. 101. But cf. Haver-
land v. Lane, 89 Wash. 557, 154 Pac. 1118 (1916).
24. Hotchkiss v. Fischer. 136 Kan. 530, 16 P. (2d) 531 (1932), noted in (1933)
46 HARV. L. REv. 847.
25. Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419 (1909), the leading case on this doctrine; cf.
Backus v. Kirsch, 264 Mich. 339, 249 N. IV. 872 (1933) ; Poole v. Camden, 79 W. Va.
310, 92 S. E. 454 (1917); 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 9, §1171. In some cases
there is no need to spell out a special relationship between an officer and an individual
stockholder, per se. in order to hold the officer liable. For instance, in cases of actual
fraud on the part of the officer, such as misrepresentations as to the value of the stock,
the courts uniformly hold that the stockholder may, as any other defrauded party,
either rescind the sale and recover the stock or affirm the transaction and sue for
damages. Bollstrom v. Duplex Power Car Co., 208 Mich. 15, 175 N. W. 492 (1919);
Hume v. Steele, 59 S. W. 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900); Morrison v. Snow, 26 Utah
247, 72 Pac. 924 (1903); cf. Pellio v. Bulls Head Coal Co., 224 Pa. 379, 73 Atl. 451
(1909); Barber v. Kilbourn, 16 Wis. 485 (1863). But cf. Boddy v. Henry, 113 Iowa
462, 85 N. W. 771 (1901). Moreover, where the court can find a bona fide agency
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would have been imposed in the absence of any of the special circumstances
which there existed, is, of course, impossible to determine. It is unlikely
that magic significance is attached to any particular series of elements or
events, but it is not inconceivable that, because of the gravity and the highly
confidential nature of protective committee services, the courts will be will-
ing, upon slight provocation, to declare protective committee members liable
for non-disclosure to non-depositors when purchasing their securities. 3
As a practical matter, however, committee members frequently are able to
capitalize on inside information, in violation of the rules governing the con-
duct of fiduciaries.27 In fact, it is not uncommon for deposit agreements
expressly to permit committee members and their affiliates to buy and sell
the securities and certificates of deposit covered by the agreement and to
become financially interested in the property which is being reorganized.
8
As a result of these provisions, or indeed even without benefit of authoriza-
tion of this sort, protective committees, as revealed in a recent investigation,
have developed trading on the basis of inside information concerning reor-
ganizations into a large-scale enterprise." Thus, a well-known bond house
not only organized a great number of hand-picked protective committees to
handle securities which the house had formerly underwritten, but in addition
had an elaborate system by which inside information was conve 'ed from
the committee members to the department of the bond house which traded
in securities.30 Naturally, under such an arrangement, the bond house could
trade most profitably at the expense of the security holders whose interests
the committee members were supposedly protecting. Furthermore, it is
relationship, the officer may be held liable irrespective of the fact that the parties
are officer and stockholder. In re Parker's Estate, 189 Iowa 1131, 179 N. NV. 525
(1920) ; Mulvane v. O'Brien, 58 Kan. 463, 49 Pac. 607 (1897) ; Fisher v. Budlong, 10
R. I. 525 (1873).
26. This result follows especially since it has been held that the duties of protective
committee members "are in the highest degree of a fiduciary nature, far more so than
the directors of a corporation:' upon whom the courts have repeatedly shown a wil-
lingness to impose liability for unfairly profiting at the expense of individual stock-
holders. Carter v. Nat. Bank of Pocahontas, 128 Md. 581, 590. 98 At. 77, 80 (1916);
cf. Holmes v. McDonald. 226 I. 169. 90 N. E. 714 (1907).
27. See generally S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 17, Parts III, IV. VI. Some com-
mittees, indeed, have gone so far as to insert in the deposit agreements provisions in-
tended to free committee members from all the duties usually imposed upon fiduciaries.
S. E. C.. supra, Part III, at 58. Many agreements contain various exculpatory clauses
designed to free committee members, as long as they act in good faith, from personal
liability for failure to exercise proper diligence in protecting the interests of security
holders. S. E. C., supra, Part III, at 59.
28. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 17. Part III, at 59, Part IV, at 97-98. In Part III,
page 195, of the Report it is stated: "The question of whether or not an immunity
clause in the deposit agreement is effective to waive or modify the equitable principle
that a trustee may not profit from his trust has seldom been litigated and consequently
never been definitely determined." Cf. Miller v. Dodge, 28 Misc. 640, 59 N. Y. Supp.
1070 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
29. S. E. C., op. cit. supra note 17, Part III, at 132-152.
30. Id. at 134 cf seq.
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exceedingly improbable that a committee member will ever be called to
account for such misuse of inside information. The use of inside informa-
tion and the fact that it motivated or influenced the purchase is generally
difficult to prove. The security holder is rarely in a position to get the facts
upon which to base an action, and the expenses and hazards of such litiga-
tion are too great for the usual small security holder to bear.81 In addition,
where the securities are sold on the exchange or even over-the-counter, it
may be impossible for the seller to trace his stock into the hands of a
member of the committee. In this situation, the interests of the vast majority
of security holders who become parties to deposit agreements would be in-
sufficiently protected even though all courts were as willing to hold com-
mittee members liable for the misuse of inside information as was the court
in the principal case. For, under the rule of the principal case, a committee
member may always trade in the securities subject to his trust provided he
makes an honest disclosure of the material facts concerning the value of the
securities. "Honest disclosures" of "material facts," however, may be made
and oppression still practiced. Superior knowledge may so guide the man-
ner of making "honest disclosures" and the emphasis so placed upon "ma-
terial facts" that a frank and an accurate impression of the value of the
securities may not be conveyed to the seller.3 2 If the security holder is to
be protected adequately it would seem essential that committee members be
prohibited altogether from trading in the securities and certificates of deposit
which are subject to their trust.3 3 This is the rule which has prevailed for
years in the field of personal trusts, 34 and there seems to be no sound reason
why it would not work as well when applied to protective committees.
STATE JURISDICTION TO TAX INCOME OF RESIDENT
DERIVED FROM FOREIGN REALTY*
THE RECENT case of Senior v. Braden," against the background of the
Stipreme Court's conspicuous opposition to multiple state taxation of the
same economic interest,2 has clouded the constitutional future of state in-
come taxes. In Senior v. Braden an Ohio "property" tax "measured by
31. Cf. id. at 61.
32. Cf. id. at 139-140.
33. See S.E.C., op. cit. supra note 17, Part III, at 151, Part IV, at 98; cf. Section
16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 896, 15 U. S.C. § 78(p) 1934.
34. 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTEEs (1935) §§481, 489, 490, 543.
*People ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 271 N.Y. 353, 3 N.E. (2d) 508 (1936), reversing
246 App. Div. 335, 286 N.Y. Supp. 485 (3d Dep't, 1936).
1. 295 U.S. 422 (1935), (1935) 24 CALIF. L. REv. 200; (1935), 35 COL. L. Rav.
1151; (1935) 21 CORN L. Q. 151; (1935) 4 FORDHAM L. REV. 526; (1935) 49 HARV.
L. REv. 159; (1935) 21 IOWA L. REV. 147; (1935) 20 MINN. L. REV. 99; (1935)
14 N. C.L. REv. 106: (1935) 14 TEX. L. REV. 242; 11 Wis. L. REV. 305.
2. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 209 (1930); First
National Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
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income"3 was held constitutionally inapplicable to transferable trust certifi-
cates representing interests in land outside the state.4 While the difference
between a tax professedly "on" income and one "on" property but meas-
ured by the income from it seems verbal,5 it is enough of a difference to allow
the Supreme Court to uphold a state income tax on income drawn from
foreign realty if it wants to; the court has depended before on conveyancers'
distinctions in tax cases. 6 But there is no reason to suspect that the present
Supreme Court is reluctant to limit the taxing power of the states, and
Senior v. Braden, nominally a case on property taxation, may become the
leading case on state jurisdiction to tax income.7
Ignoring these portents, the New York Court of Appeals has recently
held,8 three judges dissenting,9 that income of a resident of New York derived
from rents and mortgage interest from New Jersey realty vps subject to
the New York income tax. 0
Pollock v. The Farmers' Loan and Trust Co."- is the most direct authority
for interpreting Senior v. Braden against the validity of the New York tax
in the Graves case. In the Pollock case, in finding the federal tax on income
from realty to be "direct" within the constitutional prohibition against un-
apportioned direct taxes, 2 the Court held that a tax on income is equivalent
to a tax on the source of that income. If the case is revived in all its apparent
bluntness, as Sehior v. Braden hints, the Supreme Court will treat income
taxes as indistinguishable for all purposes from taxes on the property from
3. The Court seems so to treat the tax. The majority opinion distinguishes Maguire
v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920) partially on the ground that it was an income tax.
Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422, 431 (1935). In the dissent Mr. Justice Stone calls it
a property tax measured by income, id. at 436. The Ohio Supreme Court calls it a
tax "on" the income. Senior v. Braden, 128 Ohio St. 597, 610, 193 N.E. 614, 619
(1934).
4. The Court relied on Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U.S. 5S9 (1915), which held that
for procedural purposes that an assignee of an equitable interest had an interest in the
trust res. The case seems particularly inadequate in view of the fact that in Brown -.
Fletcher it was not a business trust, but a testimentary one, and also that the cestui
had an absolute right to the corpus in the future, while in Senior v. Braden no such
right existed.
5. See Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 120 (1920).
6. Compare Klein v. United States, 283 U. S. 231 (1931) with Helvering v. St. Louis
Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935).
7. Lowndes, Rate and Measure in Jurisdiction to Tax-A termath of Max=,:l t.
Bugbee, (1935) 49 HARv. L. REv. 756, 769.
8. People ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 271 N.Y. 353, 3 N.E. (2d) 503 (1936) re, erzirg
246 App. Div. 335, 286 N. Y. Supp. 485 (3d Dep't, 1936).
9. The case is directly contra to an earlier New York decision. Pierson v. Lynch,
237 App. Div. 763, 263 N.Y. Supp. 259 (3d Dep't 1933), aff'd without opinion, 263 N.Y.
533, 189 N. E. 684 (1933), writ of certiorari dimnissed as iinprot4dently granted, 293 U.S.
52 (1934), note (1933) 43 YztE L. J. 851. The New Hampshire court has also reached
a conclusion contra to that of the instant case. In re Opinion of the Justices, 84 N.H.
559, 573, 149 AtL 321, 328-329 (1930).
10. N.Y. TAx LAw § 359, as amended by New York Laws 1935, ch. 933.
11. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), On rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
12. U.S. Coxsr. Art. 1, §§ 2, 9.
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which income is derived; and the constitutional rules of jurisdiction to tax
property will be imported bodily into the law of state income taxation. But
the proposition which the Pollock case is supposed to represent is by no
means inevitably embedded in constitutional law. In Brushaber v. Union
Pacific R. R.,23 Chief Justice White specifically denied that the Pollock case
was authority for the holding so often attributed to it; subsequent cases have
impliedly denied the ruling by upholding taxes inconsistent with it.14 Thus,
in Maguire v. Trefry,'5 New York was permitted to tax its resident on income
from a Pennsylvania trust; in Lawrence v. State Tax Commission'0 a Mis-
sissippi tax on income earned by its resident in Tennessee was upheld; in
Peck & Co. v. Lowe the federal tax on income drawn from an exporting
business was declared constitutional ;17 the net income of a corporation en-
gaged in interstate commerce may be taxed by the state of corporate domi-
cile ;18 a federal excise tax was upheld even though it was measured by income
coming partly from non-taxable bonds.' 9
If, however, the doctrine that a tax on income is equivalent to a tax on
its source is to be revived by extending Senior v. Braden to state income
taxes, the tax at issue in the Graves case would seem clearly invalid when
applied to rents from New Jersey land. The tax would then be considered
a tax on the taxpayer's interest in New Jersey realty, here a legal life estate,
20
which is much more tangibly a "real" interest, taxable only at the state of
its situs, than the vague equitable interest in Senior v. Braden.
This putative invalidity of a state income tax applied to rents, under the
combined doctrine of the Pollock case and Senior v. Braden, would not be
conclusive as to a state income tax on mortgage interest. Mortgage interest
is consideration for a loan, to which the realty is merely collateral. The
Supreme Court has held both that the state of the mortgagee's domicile may
impose a property tax on a mortgage on foreign lands, 21 and that the inter-
est of a non-resident mortgagee is liable to a property tax in the state where
the land is situated.22 The trend away from multiple taxation of the same
13. 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
14: However, see National Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 508 (1928);
Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922).
15. 253 U. S. 12 (1920). There is considerable doubt as to whether this case has
been overruled by Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422 (1935). The dissent in the Graves
case believes it has; Mr. Justice Stone in his dissent doesn't know whether it is
overruled or merely "discredited". A strong argument could be made that it is only
distinguished.
16. 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
17. Despite U. S. CoNsr. Art. 1, § 9, 247 U. S. 165 (1918).
18. U.S. Glue Corp. v. Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
19. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1910).
20. Relator was beneficiary under the will of her husband of a life estate in the
rents and mortgages. There were three executors, two living in New Jersey and
managing the estate there, and relator.
21. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491 (1879).
22. Savings and Loan Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421 (1898) (Oregon
property tax on non-resident mortgagee's interest in mortgage upheld as an interest
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economic interests has not yet been extended to the problem of mortgages; it
may be that the Supreme Court will restrict all taxation of the scattered
property rights embodied in mortgages to either the state of the mortgagee's
domicile or the state in which the land is located, despite the fact that both
states protecz part of the mortgagee's divided property in the mortgage.
The mortgage tax might also be invalidated by a contraction of the vaguely
defined2 doctrine of business situs. The recent single-tax cases;4 in the
Supreme Court on jurisdiction to tax have not so far explicitly chosen as be-
tween the acknowledged power of the state of business situs"5 and the equally
acknowledged power of the state of the creditor's domicile;- but the
dissent in the Graves case argued that as the documents were located and the
investments managed in New Jersey, they had acquired a taxable situs there,
a fact which was thought to be conclusive of unconstitutionality. But the
conclusion seems premature; the business situs rule has been used to uphold
property taxes by the state of situs, not yet to invalidate either property
or income taxes by the domicilary state.
The Graves case illustrates dramatically how ineffective action by the
Supreme Court, under the Fourteenth Amendment, must be to resolve the
sharp conflict of equities which underlies the problem of state jurisdiction to
tax. As there is no method of apportioning taxation to benefits received,2
it is felt that each state is entitled to tax in full interests which it protects
in part. On the other hand, haphazard and overlapping taxes, penalizing
interstate interests, suggest that the size of the economic interest rather
than the fortuitous position of state lines should determine the total of
taxation to which property should be subjected.
Several legislative solutions of the problem have been suggested. One
plan proposes the surrender of state taxation of intangibles to the federal
in land); Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U.S. 133 (1900) (Minnesota property
tax on credits secured by mortgages on Minnesota land and handled there for New
York owner upheld). Cf. New Orleans v. Stemple, 175 U.S. 309 (1899).
23. Actual presence of the documents in the taxing state does not seem to be
essential to establish business situs. Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co. v.
Board of Assessors, 221 U.S. 346 (1911) (unevidenced credits); Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. of New York v. New Orleans, 205 U.S. 395 (1907) (notes kept outside
taxing state till due).
24. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930); Baldwin
v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930); Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 2M
U. S. 1 (1930); First National Bank v. Mfaine. 284 U. S. 312 (1932) ; Safe Deposit
and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929); Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422
(1935).
25. New Orleans v. Stemple, 175 U.S. 309 (1899); State Board of Assessors v.
Comptoir National D'Escompte, 191 U. S. 383 (1903); Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. of New York v. New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395 (1907): Liverpool & London & Globe
Insurance Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U.S. 346 (1911).
26. See State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 319-320 (U. S. 1872).
27. There is of course allocation of corporate income taxes where a corporation
does business in more than one state. Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain,
254 U.S. 113 (1920); Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
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government, with an allocation of proceeds to the states,28 but the practical
difficulties in the adoption of state and federal legislation and the objections
which the Supreme Court is likely to find in the Constitution" seem im-
passable barriers. Another suggested solution is the adoption by the states
of uniform reciprocal exemption statutes. 30 But the unanimity and uniformity
necessary to the success of this scheme make it politically improbable. Comity
clauses present the same difficulty. While a few steps have been taken in
this direction, it does not seem as if a legislative program were immediately
obtainable.
Judicial efforts to solve the problem by denying the constitutionality of
more than one tax on the same interest have thoroughly confused the law
and practice of state taxation and have piled up onerous precedents enlarging
the scope of judicial review under the Fourteenth Amendment. The develop-
ment has been resisted by bitter dissents3 ' and the almost unanimous opposi-
tion of commentators ;32 but there has been no evidence yet that the Supreme
Court will compromise. The Graves case gives the Court an occasion to
extend its jurisdiction doctrines radically beyond the field of inheritance and
property taxes, where they have so far been confined, by declaring finally
whether or not income taxes are taxes "on" the property from which income
is derived, and to illustrate the chaos which constant litigation as to the
source of income will involve, if the answer to the question is written in the
mood of Senior v. Braden.
EFFECT OF THE DEATH OF THE SURETY ON A DEPOSITORY BOND
FOR AN INDEFINITE TERM *
IN 1924 the president of a bank as surety executed a bond, in accordance
with the provisions of the National Bankruptcy Act,' to secure the repay-
ment of funds deposited in the bank by trustees in bankruptcy. The surety
died in 1926. In 1930 the trustee of a bankrupt estate opened an account
with the bank and made deposits therein until 1931 when the bank, having
28. Haig, Federal Tax Collection with Allocation of Share of Proceeds to the
States (1933) 11 TAX MAG. 95; Rodell, A Primer on Interstate Taxation (1934) 44
YALE L. J. 1166, 1181.
29. Cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
30. Report of National Committee on Inheritance Taxation, New Orleans, November
10, 1925, pp. 40-48, 77; Proceedings of the Second National Conference on Inheritance
and Estate Taxation, New Orleans, November 10, 1925, pp. 17-26; Brady, Statutory
Solutions of Multiple Death Taxation, (1927) 13 Am. B. A. J. 147; for a contrary
discussion and the statutes, see Legis. (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 641. Beuscher, Overlapping
State Income Tax Laws (1932) 8 Wis. L. REv. 320.
31. Mr. Justice Holmes in Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S.
204, 216 (1930); Mr. Justice Stone in First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U. S. 312,
331 (1932) and in Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422 (1935).
32. The best periodical literature is cited by Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax-Another
Word, (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 582, n. 2. See also notes cited note 2, supra.
* Chain v. Wilhelm, 84 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
1. 30 STAT. 558, 562 (1898), 11 U.S.C. §§ 78(h), 101 (1934).
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become insolvent, closed its doors. The trustee in bankruptcy brought suit on
the bond against the executrix of the deceased surety to recover the balance
in the account. The Circuit Court of Appeals denied recovery on the ground
that, because more than a reasonable time had elapsed since the execution of
the surety contract, the liability under it had terminated before the trustee
made his first deposit.
2
In determining the effect of the death of the surety on the liability of
his estate under depository bonds of the instant type, most courts rely either
on cases involving ordinary continuing guaranties or on decisions relating
to official bonds, depending upon the category in which they find the "closer
analogy.3 It may be pointed out, however, that significant differences are
to be found between depository bonds and either of the other two types. The
usual continuing guaranty, where no present consideration is given in ex-
change,4 is a continuing offer of a promise to stand security 'for advances
made to the principal, and this promise does not become a binding contract
until accepted by the act of the obligee in advancing credit on the strength
of the guaranty; those offers which had not been previously accepted are
terminated by the death of the offeror.0 The orthodox view .Js that death
of itself ends the relationship," while a few jurisdictions require notice,
actual or constructive, to relieve from liability Even where a seal.or nom-
inal consideratioi is present, the courts for the -most part hold the continuing
guaranty to be a revocable offer, without careful analysis of the considera-
tion given for it.s If, however, the obligation is for a definite time or involves
2. Chain v. Wilhelm, 84 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936) (Parker, J., dissented).
3. In the instant case, the majority, on the basis of the analogy to a continuing
guaranty, termed the bond a continuing offer, which because of the attached seal was
itself a contract. In accordance with RFSTATEMENr, CoNTc CTs (1932) § 46, it was then
held that such an offer, where no time is fixed in the offer itself, cannot be terminated
within a reasonable time either by revocation or by the offeror's death, the problem
then becoming what was a reasonable time. The dissent saw no difference in principle
between the depository bond and an official bond. Cf. Continental Casualty Co. v.
United States, 68 F. (2d) 577 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934); United States v. Robson, 9 F.
Supp. 446 (S. D. V. Va. 1935).
4. The effect of consideration would be to make the offer irrevocable for the time
fixed in the offer, or if no such time is fixed, for a reasonable time. See supra note 3.
5. R STATEmENT, CoxTRAcrs (1932) §§ 44, 48; 2 WIL so ON, CoNTIrcTs (1920)
§ 1253; see cases cited infra notes 6 and 7.
6. Aitken v. Lang's Adm'r., 106 Ky. 652, 51 S. IV. 154 (1899); Jordan v. Dobbins,
122 Mass. 168 (1877); American Chain Co. %. Arrow Grip fg. Co., 134 Misc. 321,
235 N.Y. Supp. 228 (Sup. Ct. 1929); cf. In re Kellcy's Estate, 173 Mich. 492, 139
N.XV. 250 (1913); In re Lorch's Estate, 284 Pa. 500, 131 At. 331 (1925).
7. Gay v. Ward, 67 Conn. 147, 34 AtI. 1025 (1895); Buckeye Cotton Oil Co.,
v. Amrhein, 168 La. 139, 121 So. 602 (1929); Menard v. Scudder, 7 La. Ann. 385
(1852). The general rule is that the death of the offeror revokes an offer, but if
the offeree, acting in ignorance of the death, performs the act which the offer called
for, the application of this rule works an obvious hardship on the offeree; these cases
represent an attempt by the courts to prevent this hardship.
8. Aitken v. Lang's Adm'r., 106 Ky. 652, 51 S. V. 154 (1899); Jordan v. Dobbins,
122 Mass. 168 (1877); Hyland v. Habich, 150 Mass. 112, 22 N.E. 765 (1S9);
American Chain Co. v. Arrow Grip Mfg. Co., 134 Misc. 321, 235 N.Y. Supp. 228
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the performance of a particular contract or office, and the actual considera-
tion for the surety's promise is given at the outset, the surety, having ob-
tained the benefit of his bargain, cannot withdraw nor will his death relieve
his estate.9 Thus, the term of a bond required as a condition precedent to the
creation of an official status is held to be co-extensive with the term of office
of the principal' and survives the death of the surety." This rule applies
even where the acts guaranteed may cover a long or indefinite period of
time.'
2
The bond in the instant case differs from a continuing guaranty mainly in
that it is an indivisible contract whereby the surety promises the United States
that he will make good any defalcation on the part of the bank in respect
of its duties as authorized depository of bankruptcy funds, the trustees in
bankruptcy being the beneficiaries of such promise.' 3 Accordingly, it is held
that the surety cannot terminate his liability for future deposits under the
bond simply by giving notice to the court and the bank, as can be done in
the case of a continuing guaranty by giving notice to the obligee,'1 4 but must
secure a court order to terminate his liability on the obligation.' 5 Important
differences between a depository bond and an official bond appear not only
in the character of the principals, but also in the fact that in the case of
official bonds, the surety has obtained the full benefit of his bargain once
the principal takes office, whereas in the case of depository bonds, the surety
is interested in the deposits themselves, with the status of authorized depos-
itory only a means to that end.
Due to these differences, it is submitted that these depository bonds de-
serve separate classification, and therefore that precedent from cases involving
continuing guaranties or official bonds is not controlling. And in determin-
ing the effect of the death of the surety on a depository bond the court
should consider the particular facts underlying such bonds rather than ab-
stract principles of contract law. Since the main purpose of the appointment
of the trustee in bankruptcy is to safeguard the funds of a bankrupt estate,
it does not seem unreasonable to require the trustee to investigate the security
(Sup. Ct. 1929). This attitude on the part of some courts has been criticized as an
added source of confusion. See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1253.
9. Hecht v. Weaver, 34 Fed. 111 (C. C. D. Ore. 1888); United States v. Keiver,
56 Fed. 422 (C. C. W. D. Wis. 1893); Fewlass v. Keeshan, 88 Fed. 573 (C. C. A. 6th,
1898); Lloyd's v. Harper, 16 Ch. Div. 290 (1880).
10. Westervelt v. Mohrenstecher, 76 Fed. 118 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896); Exeter Bank
v. Rogers, 7 N. H. 21 (1834).
11. Pond v. United States, 111 Fed. 989 (C.C. A. 9th, 1901); Moore v. Wallis,
18 Ala. 458 (1850); Hecht v. Skaggs, 53 Ark. 291, 13 S. W. 930 (1890); Mowbray
v. State, 88 Ind. 324 (1882) ; Snyder v. State, 5 Wyo. 318, 40 P. 441 (1895).
12. Estate of Rapp v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 113 Ill. 390 (1885); Royal Life Insurance
Co. v. Davies, 40 Ia. 469 (1875); Green v. Young, 8 Greenl. 14 (Me. 1831); Shack-
amaxon Bank v. Yard, 150 Pa. 351, 24 Atd. 635 (1892); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
(1920) § 1253; cf. cases cited supra note 10.
13. See Illinois Surety Co. v. United States, 226 Fed. 665, 668 (C. C. A. 7th, 1915)
Bosler v. United States, 26 F. (2d) 4, 8, 9 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
14. See cases supra notes 6 and 7.
15. Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 68 F. (2d) 577 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
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of the bond of a contemplated depository. On the other hand, the bond
provides that the obligation is to be of full force and effect unless the bank
faithfully discharges and performs all the duties pertaining to it as such de-
pository. The surety has knowingly assumed such liability for an indefinite
period in a formal document purporting to bind his heirs, executors, and
successors; and, moreover, death will not ordinarily terminate a contract
which does not require the personal services of the deceased. Furthermore,
there are mitigating factors in the possible hardship upon the surety since upon
either a petition to the court praying for the termination of liability under the
bond,16 or upon notice of the death of the surety,17 the court vill require the
depository to furnish a new bond and discharge the surety from future lia-
bility under the old one. Thus, if the surety does not wish to be bound for the
full duration of the term of the depository, he can petition the court to
relieve him from future liability under the bond, or make som anticipatory
provision that notice of his death should reach the court as soon thereafter
as possible.
It may be suggested that in executing the bond the surety contemplated
that the court, in its periodic examination of these bonds,I8 would arrange
for termination of liability for future deposits where the surety has died.
However, the trustee in bankruptcy is equally justified in relying on this
investigation, ana if both prefer to substitute the inquiries of the court for
their own precautionary measures, neither can complain when liability is
imposed. As a final consideration, it seems unreasonable to give a construc-
tion to the bond which makes it possible for liability thereunder to be ter-minated, without action by the court, while the official status of the bank
as depository, which was dependent upon that liability, is permitted to
continue.
It is submitted that the possible delinquency of the trustee in bankruptcy
in failing to investigate the security of the bond is more than offset by prac-
tical reasons for holding the surety to the literal terms of his contract, and
consequently, that the liability under such bonds should not be terminated
unless by express court order. Furthermore, it seems desirable that the
courts establish a definite rule on the effect of the death of the surety on
his liability under such bcnd, rather than holding, as in the instant case, that
a depository bond is effective for only a reasonable time after execution.
Such holding makes inevitable resort to the courts in every case to determine
what is a reasonable length of time in the light of the particular circum-
stances of each case, one of which would be the death of the.surety.
16. Such petitions are practically never refused, thus giving the surety what amounts
to a power of revocation upon reasonable notice. Cf. Continental Casualty Co. v.
United States, 68 F. (2d) 577 (C. C.A. 7th, 1934).
17. Communications to the YALE LAw JoUanAL from the Clerks of the United States
District Courts for the Southern District of New York (September 23, 1936) and the
Northern District of West Virginia (September 23, 1936).
18. The bonds are checked over by e.aminers of the Department of Justice who
investigate into all phases of the security every two years. They are also checked up
at irregular intervals by Clerks of the court. In addition, the Referees have been re-
quired to keep track of the banks in which Trustees appointed by them made deposits.
Since the decision in the instant case, the Referees have again been admonished to
be unusually careful in this respect. See note 17, jupra.
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* ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES UNDER THE COMMERCE ACT AND THE
ANTI-TRUST LAWS*
THE PURPOSE of the anti-trust laws is the maintenance of business rivalry
in industry generally, and the enforcement machinery consists of the Depart-
ment of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission and the courts. The purpose
of the Interstate Commerce Act, on the other hand, is the comprehensive
regulation of the railroad industry specifically, with the maintenance of
competition and the encouragement of cooperation as coordinate aims, and
its enforcement is centered in the Interstate Commerce Commission.' As a
result, whenever some issue seems referable to both statutory schemes, a
choice must be made between the procedure prescribed by the anti-trust laws
and the remedies under the Commerce Act. In such cases the tendency in
both Congress and the courts has been toward the achievement of a unitary
system of regulation by concentrating jurisdiction over railroads in the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, 2 subject, of course, to the usual inhibitions of
judicial review, at the expense of limiting the application of the anti-trust
laws. The Clayton Act, which gave individuals the right to restrain viola-
tions of the anti-trust laws, expressly provided that carriers subject to the
provisions of the Commerce Act could be enjoined only by the government.8
Then the Keogh case denied the right of private persons to recover damages
under the anti-trust laws where the subjects of complaint were rates and
practices )vithin the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
4
And in the Cunard case the Shipping Act was held to have superseded the
right of a private suitor to an injunction under the Clayton Act and its
remedy held exclusive to the extent of transactions within its range, so that
the plaintiff, in the interests of uniformity, must seek redress before the
Shipping Board-this despite the fact that the exception in the Clayton Act
with respect to carriers subject to the Commerce Commission does not apply
in terms to wrongs within the jurisdiction of any other board.3
A recent case in the Supreme Court of the United States continues this
deyelopment. A railroad had contracted to pay a warehouse, A, for certain
services rendered in the receipt and delivery of freight and also to make no
*Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pa. R. R., 297 U.S. 500 (1936).
1. PARSONS, THE RAILWAYS, THE TRUSTS AND THE PEOPLE (1906) 494; Hotchkiss,
The Interstate Commerce Commission and its Work (1932) 2 DETROIT L. REV. 1;
Comment (1923) 36 HARy. L. REv. 456; (1934) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 478.
2. A preliminary order from the Commission was early held a prerequisite to
judicial action in all cases where the complaint involved administrative matters, prin-
cipally rates. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426 (1907).
3. 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §26 (1934).
4. Keogh v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922); Central Transfer Co.
v. Terminal Ass'n, 61 F. (2d) 546 (C. C.A. 8th, 1932), aff'd, 288 U.S. 469 (1933);
cf. Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickinson Fuel Co., 72 F. (2d) 885 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934). Contra:
Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 183 Fed. 548 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910); Gulf & S. I. R. R.
v. Buddendorft, 110 Miss. 752, 70 So. 704 (1916).
5. U. S. Navigation Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., 284 U. S. 474 (1932): see Comment
(1931) 44 HmAv. L. REV. 955; cf. Wisconsin & Mich. Transportation Co. v. Pere
Marquette Line Steamers, 210 Wis. 391, 245 N. W. 671 (1932).
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similar allowances for such services to any other warehouse in the city of
Philadelphia. The warehouse was to give the railroad in return a preference
over other lines in the use of its facilities. This practice was clearly approved
under a line of decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission until 1928,
when the Commission overruled one of them, and announced that a ware-
house doing business under such a contract was a consignor or consignee,
acting on its own behalf and not as agent for the carrier.0 A competing
warehouse, B, was quick to petition the Commission for a restraining order
against the carrier and for reparation based on past loss of profits. The
Commission declared the contract unduly discriminatory, but refused to grant
any reparation on the ground that the plaintiff's showing of damage was
too vague.7 Upon suit brought by the carrier, together with warehouse A
and other warehouse companies interveners in the proceeding before the
Commission, this order to cease and desist was sustained by a statutory
three-judge court,8 whose decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court.°
Warehouse B could, of course, take no appeal from the negative order deny-
ing reparation. 10 Instead it brought an action under the Sherman and
Clayton Acts," seeking to charge both warehouse A and the carrier with
treble damages. This time warehouse B achieved temporary success on the
ground that the causes of action provided by the anti-trust laws were wholly
distinct from those under the Commerce Act, although admittedly both suits
were based simply on the carrier's preferential treatment of a competitor. '
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, however, hold-
ing that, while warehouse B might have sued under the anti-trust acts in
the first instance, the proceedings before the Commission constituted an
election which barred any further action against either the carrier or ware-
6. McCormick Warehouse Co. v. Pa. R. R., 148 L C. C. 299 (1928); 24 STrA. 3S0
(1887), 49 U.S.C. §3 (1934).
7. Gallagher v. Pa. R. R., 160 I. C. C. 563 (1929). As to what the plaintiff must
prove in order to recover, see Fletcher, The Interstate Commerce Commission in
GROWTH OF A.aRicAx ADn'NisTRAxvE LA-v (1923) 59.
S. 'Merchants' Warehouse Co. v. United States, 44 F. (2d) 379 (E. D. Pa. 1930)
(one judge dissenting as to restraining order). It appears from the District Court's
opinion that the carrier took no part in this suit. Id. at 382.
9. Merchants' Warehouse Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 501 (1931).
10. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U. S. 282 (1912); Interstate Com-
merce Comm. v. United States, 2S9 U. S. 385 (1933); 2 ScH.%,F A-, TnE INTERSTA E
Comi",lcE Co.missIox (1931) 406-417; VYMAN, R,.mo.%D RATE RECUUz.r.o:; (2d
ed. 1915) 68; see Watldns, Has a Shipper Who has been Dcnied Relief by the lInter-
.state Commerce Commission Any Remcdyf (1917) 17 COL L RE%. 34; Comment
(1934) 34 id. 908; (1933) 1 GEo. WASH. L. RE 274. The courts do. however, review
orders which are negative merely in form, but not in effect. United States v. New
River Co., 265 U. S. 533 (1924) : Alton R. R. v. United States, 237 U. S. 229 (1932).
11. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1, 2 (1934) ; 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C.
§15 (1934).
12. Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pa. R. R., 7 F. Supp. 484 (E. D. Pa. 1934), (1935)
35 CoL L. Rev. 129. (1935) 48 HAuv. L. Rev. 520; cf. Meeker v. Lehigh Valley .R.,
183 Fed. 548 (C. C.A. 2d, 1910).
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house A.13 The Supreme Court affirmed, but on the ground apparently
that, since the Commerce Act gave a complete remedy against all persons
procuring the allowance of a forbidden preference as well as against the
carrier itself,14 the discrimination complained of did not constitute a restraint
of trade remediable even in the first instance under the anti-trust laws.15
The equities of the case, in view of the Commission's recent abrupt change
of position with respect to the practice involved, were clearly with the car-
rier.16 But, in any event, that a plaintiff should have an additional remedy
under the anti-trust laws for preferences declared illegal by the Commerce
Act would destroy, as Mr. Justice Cardozo observes, the unity and effective-
ness of a "remedial system that is complete and self-contained".' 7 Other
practical considerations support the result. judicial action under the anti-
trust laws would preclude uniform treatment; for the amount of damages
recovered might operate, like a rebate, to give the plaintiff a preference over
his competitors, and the measure of relief granted by the several juries and
courts would inevitably vary.' 8 Such action, moreover, would not only de-
tract from the finality which should be accorded the determination of a tech-
nical question by a specially equipped body with all the parties and all the
questions and evidence before it,' 9 but might also be considered, with respect
to the parties defendant before the Commission, a collateral attack on its
negative order denying reparation.
20
At the same time the decision proceeds toward a solution of the many
questions of conflicting power that are likely to arise with the continued
regulation of business practices, by statute and commission. Since the Court
is evidently willing to accept the fact that a particular issue of restraint of
trade comes within the effective reach of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
13. Pa. R. R. v. Terminal Warehouse Co., 78 F. (2d) 591 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935).
14. 24 STAT. 382 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 8 (1934); 24 STAT. 382 (1887), 49 U. S. C.
§10 (4) (1934).
15. Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pa. R. R., 297 U. S. 500 (1936). The Circuit Court
of Appeals, in holding that the election applied to the defendant warehouse as well as
the 'carrier, apparently believed that the former, since it had intervened in the pro-
ceedings before the Commission, had subjected itself to its jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court, however, disagreed, stating that the Commission's holding applied only to the
carrier. The election in the Commerce Act, furthermore, is between a proceeding for
damages before the Commission and a similar action in a District Court, and not
between a suit under the Commerce Act and one under the anti-trust laws. 24 STAT.
382 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 9 (1934). The Supreme Court did not decide whether the Com-
mission would have had jurisdiction over the warehouse had the plaintiff demanded relief
against it as well as the carrier. Cf. 34 STAT. 590 (1910), 49 U. S. C. § 16 (1) (1934);
32 STAT. 848 (1903), 49 U.S.C. §42 (1934).
16. The Court has held that damages cannot be granted in cases where the Com-
mission has declared rates illegal which it had formerly approved. Arizona Grocery
Co. v. Atchison Ry., 284 U. S. 370 (1932) ; cf. Great No. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refin-
ing Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932), (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 779.
17. Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pa. R. R., 297 U.S. 500, 514 (1936).
18. Keogh v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922).
19. Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 206 U.S. 441, 454 (1907).
20. See notes 10, 16, supra.
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sion as adequate assurance to competitors that the rates or practices com-
plained of will not effect a restraint, it will apparently continue to be difficult
to attack administered prices generally under the anti-trust laws.2 1 This
does not mean that common carriers in interstate commerce are wholly
removed from the scope of the anti-trust laws. Combinations for the estab-
lishment of uniform rates may be enjoined by the government, although the
rates themselves have been approved as reasonable by the Commission.2-'
And carriers who knowingly ally themselves with a conspiracy in restraint
of trade2 3 or who attempt to monopolize the sale or production of some
commodity2-4 are still undoubtedly liable under the anti-trust laws, at the
hands either of the government or of a private person. The holding must
be limited, as the Court was careful to observe, to cases where there is no
evidence of any wrong irremediable under the Commerce Act. The Court,
however, does not indicate how many elements of restraint other than the
allegedly discriminatory character of the rates or practices within the Com-
mission's reach are necessary before a separate attack can be entertained.
CONCLUSIVENESS OF JuRisDIcONAL DEcisioNs*
THR DEFENDANT, a Maryland corporationj operated a steamship line
between Baltimore. Norfolk and foreign ports. An employee injured aboard
one of its vessels in Norfolk harbor brought an action for damages in New
York, where he had become a resident, by attaching the company's funds in
a local bank and serving it personally without the state. The defendant,
appearing specially, moved to dismiss the action, contending that its enter-
tainment in a state where the defendant's ships did not touch would impose
an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Upon denial of the
motion by the Supreme Court and affirmance by the Appellate Division,'
whose ruling on interlocutory orders is not subject to further review,2 the
defendant moved in that court, on the same ground, for a writ of prohibition
against further proceedings in the original action. The denial of this motion
was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which held that the exercise of juris-
diction in such an action would unreasonably burden interstate commerce,
21. It is uncertain whether or not the ROD1NsoN-PATr EAz Acr, Pub. L No. 692,
74th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 19, 1936), applies to administered rates.
22. See Keogh v. Chicago & N. NV. Ry., 260 U. S. 156, 161 (1922) ; FLerCHu, supra
note 7, at 68-69. The individual must, however, seek his remedy undei the Commerce
Act. Keogh v. Chicago & N. V. Ry., .upra.
23. Cf. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
24. United States v. Lehigh Valley R. RL, 254 U. S. 255 (1920); United States
v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922); cf. Thomsen v. Union Castle Mail
S. S. Co., 166 Fed. 251 (C. C.A. 2d, 1908).
25. See Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Pa. RL IR, 297 U.S. 500, 516 (1936).
*Baltimore Mail S. S. Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N.Y. 379, 199 N.E.. 628 (1936).
1. Madsen v. Baltimore Mail S. S. Co., 244 App. Div. 809, 279 N. Y. Supp. 765
(2d Dep't 1935).
2. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Ac § 611.
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and that the defendant was not precluded by the decision upon the motion
to dismiss from raising the same objection of want of jurisdiction over the
subject matter in a petition for a writ of prohibition, since "a defendant
may raise and reiterate the objection of want of jurisdiction at any stage".
8
The principle that a court without jurisdiction cannot acquire it by its own
decision, that its judgment is "void" and therefore always open to attack, is
an ancient one which has been so often repeated as to be generally given the
force of maxim.4 For some time, however, a trend has been clearly discern-
ible toward the opposing doctrine that an issue once judicially decided should
not be relitigated in another, independent proceeding. The presumption in
favor of the validity of the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is
an old one.5 Carried over to the federal courts, it has been extended so far
that a federal judgment has been held immune from collateral attack for
want of diversity jurisdiction notwithstanding the showing of a complete
lack of diversity on the face of the record.0 Further evidence of the trend
is apparent in the evolution of a large group of "quasi-jurisdictional" facts
-such as the ownership of land in the distribution of a decedent's estate, 7
or the existence and amount of the petitioning creditor's debt in an involun-
tary proceeding in bankruptcy 8-whose sanctity is lost on collateral attack.9
The doctrine of estoppel has been applied against the assertion of lack of
jurisdiction by a party who has either invoked the court's jurisdiction him-
self or accepted the fruits of its exercise. 10 And finally, jurisdictional findings
3. Baltimore Mail S. S. Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N.Y. 379, 388, 199 N. E. 628, 632
(1936). The court disposed of the argument that prohibition is a discretionary remedy
and its denial not subject to review [People ex rel. Cuvillier v. Hagarty, 238 N. Y.
621, 144 N.E. 917 (1924)] by holding the writ issuable as of right when it is the
only remedy available: the defendant had exhausted every, remedy by appeal open to it
under the laws of the state and was not required to seek a review of the interlocutory order
by the Supreme Court of the United States before petitioning for prohibition. Prohi-
bition, however, would seem never properly issuable except when it is the only remedy
available. People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N.Y. 383, 79 N. E. 330 (1906);
People ex rel. Cuvillier v. Hagarty, supra.
4. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1873); Andrews v. Andrews, 188
U. S. 14 (1903); see Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N.Y. 326, 336, 130 N.E. 566, 569 (1921);
1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed." 1925) § 333.
5. Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319 (U. S. 1844); see Evers v. Watson, 156
U. S. 527, 532 (1895).
6. Des Moines Navigation & R. R. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U. S. 552, 557
(1887). The presumption of a finding of diversity applies a fortiori where the lack
of diversity is not apparent on the face of the record. McCormick v. Sullivant, 10
Wheat. 192 (U. S. 1825); Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U. S. 327 (1894); Windholz v.
Everett, 74 F. (2d) 834 (C. C.A. 4th, 1935).
7. Morgan v. Big Woods Lumber Co., 198 Ky. 88, 249 S.W. 329 (1923).
8. Michaels v. Post, 21 Wall. 398 (U. S. 1874).
9. Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157 (U. S. 1829); Florentine v. Barton, 2 Wall.
210 (U. S. 1864); Comstock v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 396 (U. S. 1865); see Noble v.
Uaion River Logging R. R., 147 U.S. 165, 173 (1893).
10. Bledsoe v. Seaman, 77 Kan. 679, 95 Pac. 576 (1908) ; Langewald v. Langewald,
234 Mass. 269, 125 N.E. 566 (1920); Dyckman v. New York, 5 N.Y. 434 (1851);
see Grasselli Chemical Co. v. Simon, 84 Ind. App. 327, 328, 150 N.E. 617, 618 (1925);
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have been held binding when the result of statutory construction by the
courts of sister states.11 In comparatively recent years many courts have
dispensed with these special formulas in favor of the general rule that the
principle of res judicata applies to decisions on jurisdictional questions
equally with other issues,' 2 saving them from collateral attack in the same
state or in any other so long as the defendant has appeared, either generally,
or specially to contest jurisdiction, and the court has purported to render a
judgment against him. In 1916 the Supreme Court established the consti-
tutionality of the rule under the due process clause,13 and fourteen years later
it was unequivocally adopted by the Court in Baldwin v. Iowa State Travel-
ing Men's Association.'4
The conclusiveness of rulings on personal jurisdiction has been rational-
ized on the theory that a special appearance to contest jurisdiction is a sub-
mission to the "limited jurisdiction" of the 'court to determine'its "ultimate
jurisdiction" over the parties. 15 The application of res judicata to decisions
with respect to jurisdiction over the subject matter is a more difficult question
conceptually; for it is said to be elementary that jurisdiction over the subject
1 FnEEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 320; 3 id. § 1438. But see Grubb v. Public
Utilities Comm. of Ohio, 281 U.S. 470, 475 (1930); cf. Hollingshead v. Hollingshead,
91 N.J. Eq. 261, 110 At. 19 (Ch. 1920) (exception in divorce cases).
11. Amer. Ry. Exp. Co. v. Royster Guano Co., 273 U. S. 274 (1927); Grubb v.
Public Utilities Comm. of Ohio, 281 U. S. 470 (1930).
12. Moch v. Va. Fire Ins. Co., 10 Fed. 696 (C.C.E.D.Va. 1882); Phelps v.
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn, 112 Fed. 453 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901); Chinn v. Foster-
Milburn Co., 195 Fed. 158 (W.D.N.Y. 1912); Valentine v. Police Court of San
Francisco, 141 Cal. 615, 75 Pac. 336 (1904); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. National
Storage Co., 260 Ill. 485, 103 N.E. 227 (1913); Hall v. Wilder Mfg. Co., 316 Mo.
812, 293 S. V. 760 (1927) ; Simmons Co. v. Sloan, 104 N.J. L. 612, 142 Ad. 15 (1928) ;
see Medina, Conclusiveness of Rulings on Jurisdiction (1931) 31 COL L Rzv. 238;
Comments (1928) 41 HAR%. L RE. 1055, (1931) 26 Iu. L. REy. 432; cf. (1936)
45 Y. iL L. J. 1499 (faulty cause of action as ground for collateral attack). But see
Farrier, Full Faith and Credit of Adjudication of Jurisdictional Facts (1935) 2 U. or
Cnx. L. REv. 552.
13. Chicago Life Ins. Co. Y. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25 (1917).
14. 283 U. S. 522 (1931); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932),
(1932) 42 YaE L. J. 427, (1934) 12 N. C. L. REY. 250; REsTATrEa.-r, Co:,rwcr oF
LAws (1934) §451; -apa Valley Electric Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Cal., 251 U.S.
366 (1920) seible; cf. Jaster v. Currie, 198 U.S. 144 (1905). The Restatement pro-
vides that the defendant shall also have "participated in the proceedings". This is
suggested by earlier cases. Cf. Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254 (1891); see
Cherry v. Chicago Life Ins. Co., 190 Ill. App. 70, 73 (1914), aff'd, Chicago Life Ins.
Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25 (1917). But the rule is not so limited in the two Baldwin
cases, supra. Nor would it seem necessary that the jurisdictional question should have
been expressly raised; a final ruling on the merits carries with it by implication a
ruling on jurisdiction. Windholz v. Everett, 74 F. (2d) 834 (C. C. A. 4th. 1935);
Valentine v. Police Court of San Francisco, 141 Cal. 615. 75 Pac. 336 (1904). But
see National Exchange Bank of Tiffin v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 269 (1904).
15. See Stevirmac Oil & Gas Co. v. Dittman, 245 U.S. 210, 214 (1917); Comment
(1928) 41 I-.Rv. L. Rav. 1055.
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matter cannot be "waived". 0 Acceptance of the doctrine, however, would
not mean that jurisdiction over the subject matter could be "waived" just
as a party, by a general appearance, consents to the jurisdiction over his per-
son: regardless of the type of his appearance the defendant would be able
to raise the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter at any time before
final judgment in the same proceeding. By entering an appearance, whether
special or general, with an opportunity to litigate the question of jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter, the defendant would simply subject himself,
like a defendant on a special appearance to contest the court's jurisdiction
over his person, to the "limited jurisdiction" of the court. The practical
reasons for putting an end to litigation with respect to the one type of juris-
diction are as compelling as they are with respect to the other. And, while
the doubt which has been expressed as to the applicability of the doctrine
of res judicata to questions of jurisdiction over the subject matter 7 will
not be completely dispelled until the Supreme Court definitely rules on the
question, authority does exist for the proposition that rulings on such ques-
tions are final. The older formulas did not discriminate between subject
matter and person, and in addition to an apparently forgotten decision of
the Supreme Court in 189718 several recent federal cases offer support. 19
The New York Court in the instant case, in permitting a collateral attack
based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter after the question had
been considered by two courts in the original proceeding, seems to have
ignored this entire development.
2 0
The application of res judicata to rulings on jurisdiction may prove em-
barrassing to the defendant in those states where an exception properly
taken to an adverse ruling on an objection to the jurisdiction is held to be
waived by a subsequent plea in bar and defense on the merits and where, at
the same time, no interlocutory appeal is permitted from such a ruling.
2 1 If
16. Southern Pac. Ry. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 202 (1892) ; Jackson & Sons v. Lumber-
men's Mutual Casualty Co., 86 N. H. 341, 168 Ati. 895 (1933). But cf. Grasselli
Chemical Co. v. Simon, 84 Ind. App. 327, 150 N. E. 617 (1925) (jurisdiction of ad-
miiistrative board).
17. RESTATEmENT, CO NFLICT OF LAws (1934) §451, Caveat; see Medina, supra
note 12.
18. Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506 (1897).
9. Hamilton Gas Co. v. Watters, 79 F. (2d) 438 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); cf. Catholic
Soc. of Religious & Literary Education v. Madison County, 74 F. (2d) 848, 850
(C. C. A. 4th, 1935) (finding of lack of jurisdiction). See Gavit, Jurisdiction of the
Subject Matter and Ras Judicata (1932) 80 U. oF PA. L. REV. 386.
20. It is not clear, indeed, whether the commerce clause is a limitation on the
existence of jurisdiction over the subject matter or whether such jurisdiction exists,
but simply cannot be exercised in such a way as to burden int,.rstate commerce. The
entire injection of the commerce clause into the problem of interstate selection of
forums is comparatively recent. For a discussion of the cases that have arisen under
the commerce clause, see Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1100, especially 1114, n. 75.
21. Morris v. Miller, 4 Idaho 454, 40 Pac. 60 (1895); McCullough v. Railway
Mail Ass'n, 225 Pa. 118, 73 Atl. 1007 (1909); Corbett v. Physicians' Casualty Ass'n,
135 Wis. 505, 115 N. W. 365 (1908) ; see Sunderland, Preserving a Special Appearance
(1911) 9 MicH. L. RIv. 396.
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he does defend on the merits, he waives his objection to the court's juris-
diction over his person; and if he lets the action go to final judgment on the
overruling of his plea to the jurisdiction and appeals, he risks everything on
his one more or less doubtful defense to the jurisdiction, sacrificing any
defense he may have had on the merits if the judgment is affirmed. He can,
of course, enter no appearance at all and let judgment go by default, thus
preserving his right to attack it collaterally, by resisting an action thereon
or by enjoining its execution; but these tactics may again deprive him com-
pletely of his defense on the merits if his attack is unsuccessful. In such
states the defendant cannot, if res judicata be applied, obtain an appellate
ruling on both his defenses, to the jurisdiction over his person and on the
merits.2
Constitutionally, however, this procedure can be no more objectionable
than the rule in some states which allows no special appearahce whatever
and thus confines a defense on jurisdiction over the person to collateral
attack.2  The latter rule, the Supreme Court has held, is not a deprivation
of due process.&2 4 And if it be considered undesirable on considerations of
policy that the defendant should be thus compelled unalterably to selecL one
defense, his predicament can be solved very simply, either by these states'
adopting the present federal rule, which does allow a reservation of the juris-
dictional questiofi on a plea in bar,2s or by their permitting an interlocutory
appeal, as New York and other states now do, from the overruling of the
objection to the jurisdiction.20  In the former case, if the defendant fails
in his objection to the jurisdiction over his person and also, after reserving
an exception, in his defense on the merits, he may appeal by assigning error
to the disposition of both questions.2 T In the latter case he may secure an
22. An escape might be based on the argument that res judicata does not apply to
summary interlocutory rulings in general from which no appeal is possible. Bishop
v. Smith, 66 Kan. 621, 72 Pac. 220 (1903); Heidel v. Benedict, 61 Minn. 170, 63 N.W.
490 (1895). But it has been held applicable [Naigle v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha,
57 Neb. 552, 77 N.W. 1074 (1899)], at least where there has been a full hearing
[Dwight v. St. John, 25 N.Y. 203 (1862); Rogers v. McCord-Collins fercantile Co.,
19 Okla. 115, 91 Pac. 864 (1907)]. See 2 FRmE~ar-, Junans (5th ed. 1925) §717.
The dilemma does not apply at all to jurisdiction over the subject matter; for it is,
of course, not waived by a defense on the merits. See note 16, .upra.
23. York v. Texas, 73 Tex. 651, 11 S.W. 869 (1889), aff'd, 137 U.S. 15 (1S90);
Teller v. Equitable Mutual Life Ass'n, 108 Iowa 17, 78 N.V. 674 (1999). Federal
courts sitting in these states have refused to follow the rule. Southern Pac. Ry. v.
Denton, 146 U. S. 202 (1892) (Te.as statute).
24. York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890).
25. Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1878); James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co.
v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119 (1927). This practice is common to about half the states.
Chandler v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 149 Ind. 601, 49 N. E. 579 (1693) ; Fisher v. Crowley,
57 W. Va. 312, 50 S. E. 422 (1905) ; see Sunderland, rupra note 21, at 405.
26. Townsend v. Hendricks, 40 How. Pr. 143 (N.Y. 1370); Skinner v. Carter,
108 N. C. 106, 12 S. E. 908 (1891) ; see note 2, supra.
27. The court in the instant case argued that this procedure, while it may guarantee
the defendant due process, is not adequate protection where the objection to jurisdiction
is based rather on the commerce clause, in which case a trial on the merits is the very
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appellate ruling on both defenses seriatim. It is, therefore, not essential to a
fair presentation of the defendant's case that he be permitted to attack a
jurisdictional ruling, whether of person or of subject matter, at his discre-
tion, when no practical reason any longer exists for considering an erroneous
decision of this sort any more "a denial of constitutional rights" and any
less the result of "the imperfection of man" 28 than an erroneous decision on
any other question.
PRIORITY OF CITY'S CLAIM FOR SALES TAXES COLLECTED BY
BANKRUPT VENDOR *
THE CITY of New York filed a claim in the bankruptcy of a merchant,
demanding priority for sales taxes collected by the bankrupt and not paid
over to the city." The city relied on two sections of the Bankruptcy Act, one
allowing priority to claims for taxes, and the other giving priority to persons
entitled thereto under state law. 2 The court allowed the claim, but refused
to grant it priority, holding that the funds, having been collected by the bank-
rupt, were no longer a tax but a debt, and that the city was not entitled to
priority under state law.3
The court's refusal to allow the claim priority as a claim for taxes seems
orthodox. According to the decided weight of authority, a tax collector's
liability to the taxing body is similar to that of any agent who has received
burden which is unconstitutional. Baltimore Mail S. S. Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N. Y.
379, 389, 199 N.E. 628, 632 (1936); Michigan C. R. R. v. Mix, 278 U. S. 492 (1929)
semble; Denver & R. G. W. R. R. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284 (1932) semble.
28. Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U. S. 25, 30 (1917) (Holmes, J.).
* Matter of Lazaroff, City of New York v. Goldstein, 84 F. (2d) 982 (C. C. A. 2d,
1936).
1. The right of priority in this type of case is of considerable importance as it
appears that at the present time the City is creditor for such taxes in over four
hundred bankruptcies in the Southern District of New York alone. Petition for writ
of certiorari, September 4, 1936, p. 13, Matter of Lazaroff, City of New York v.
Goldstein, 84 F. (2d) 982 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
2. 44 STAT. 666 (1926), 11 U.S. C. § 104 (1934). The term "person" is defined
in the statute as including corporations. This includes municipal corporations. City of
Lincoln v. Ricketts, 297 U. S. 373 (1936).
3. Matter of Lazaroff, City of New York v. Goldstein, 84 F. (2d) 982 (C. C. A.
2d, 1936). The same result on the first question has been reached by a district court.
In re Goldstein, 13 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. N.Y. 1935). The lower New York courts
are divided on the question. Priority granted: Matter of Lichtman Clothes, Inc.,
N. Y. L. J., January 4, 1936, p. 58, col. 2; In re Shapiro, N. Y. L. J., December 17,
1935, p. 2472, col. 1; In re Rich Frocks, Inc., N. Y. L. J., January 14, 1936, p. 240,
col. 1; Matter of La Chic Shops, Inc., N. Y. L. J., January 29, 1936, p. 529, col. 6;
In re Fordon, N. Y. L. J., September 2, 1936, p. 577, col. 1. Priority denied: Matter
of Relkin, N. Y. L. J., September 22, 1936, p. 792, col. 2; Wellworth Sales, Inc. v.
Goldstein, N. Y. L. J., September 22, 1936, p. 792, col. 3; Matter of Kaplan, N. Y. L. J.,
September 30, 1936, p. 935, col. 1; In re Itkin, N. Y. L. J., September 11, 1936, p. 652,.
col. 2; In re Terman, N. Y. L. J., September 11, 1936, p. 652, col. 3.
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money on his principal's account, and therefore, once the taxpayer has paid
the collector, the distinguishing title of "tax" disappears.4 Moreover, an
individual may be a collector within this rule even though he is compelled to
pay over the money as an incident of carrying on some business, such as
selling tickets or gasoline, provided that he is not intended to bear the ulti-
mate tax burden, but is to pass the tax on to others.8 Accordingly, since it
seems evident from the provisions of the New York City Sales Tax Law
that the ultimate tax burden is intended to fall on the purchaser rather than
on the merchant,0 the city's claim in the principal case might propeyly -be
called the debt of a collector, rather than a tax.
In regard to the city's right to priority under state law, a possible argu-
ment is suggested by a decision holding that money collected as in the instant
case is held in trust for the taxing authority.
7 But to receive a preference
under this doctrine, the trust res would have to be traceable into the hands
of the trustee in bankruptcy,8 something which was here precluded, since the
money from the sales taxes was concededly never turned over to the trustee.
0
However, the court might well have allowed the city priority on the ground
of sovereignty. Under English law the crown is entitled to priority of pay-
ment over general creditors of an insolvent. 10 It has usually been held that
this is an attribute of sovereignty and a part of the common law adopted by
the states in blanket form after the Revolution." In some cases the priority
4. In re Waller, 142 Fed. 883 (D. Md. 1905); Bent v. Inhabitants of Hubbardston,
138 Mass. 99 (1884); Matter of Niederstein, 154 App. Div. 238, 138 N. Y. Supp.
952 (2d Dep't 1912).
5. Nolte et al. v. Hudson Navigation Co., 8 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); In re
Wyoming Valley Ice Co., 145 Fed. 267 (M. D. Pa. 1906); Pennsylvania v. York Sillk
Manufacturing Co., 192 Fed. 81 (C. C.A. 3d, 1911); In re Martin, 75 F. (2) 618
(C. C. A. 7th, 1935); Pennsylvania v. Stocker, 70 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 3d, 1934).
Contra: Missouri v. Ross, 80 F. (2d) 329 (C.C. A. 8th, 1935).
6. Local Law No. 25, 1934. This act is cited in several opinions as Local Law No.
24, 1934. It provides, in part, that the tax "shall be paid by the purchaser to the
vendor, for and on account of the City of New York" (§2), that the property of
both vendor and purchaser is liable for nonpayment (§ 8), and that refund applications
should be by the purchaser, or vendor only if he has repaid the purchaser (§ 10).
While the provisions of § 8 provide ground for an argument that the vendor is more
than a mere agent, it would seem equally plausible to construe the provision as merely
providing a special security for the vendor's liability as agent. But see interpretation
of the New York motor fuel tax in In re Riemer, 82 F. (2d) 162 (C.C.A. 2d, 1936).
7. Shipe v. Consumers' Service Co., 28 F. (2d) 53 (N. D. Ind. 1928); State v.
Canfield Oil Co., 34 Ohio App. 267, 171 N.E. 111, aff'd, 122 Ohio St. 175, 171 N.E.
33 (1930).
8. Matter of Cavin v. Gleason, 105 N.Y. 256, 11 N. F 504 (1887) ; Matter of Hicks,
170 N.Y. 195, 63 N.E. 276 (1902) ; see BoGERT, TRusTs AiD Tnus'rs (1st ed. 1935)
§ 866; Comment (1931) 30 MicH. L. REv. 441. 0
9. Brief for appellee, p. 24, Matter of Lazaroff, 84 F. (2d) 932 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
10. In re Henley & Co., 9 Ch. D. 469 (1878); 1 CooI .'s B.AcnTSo.,E (2d ed. 1872)
154.
11. Marshall v. New York, 254 U.S. 380 (1920); Pennsylvania v. Stocker, 70 F.
(2d) 453 (C. C.A. 3d, 1934); fi re Martin, 75 F. (2d) 619 (C. C.A. 7th, 1935);
Seay v. Bank of Rome, 66 Ga. 609 (1881); State of Maryland v. Bank of Maryland,
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is expressly declared by statute. 12 Although it is usually said not to extend
to the political subdivisions of the states,
13 it may be so enlarged by statute.
1 4
In New York the state is entitled to priority for debts and taxes ;15 the
political subdivisions of the state enjoy a similar preference for unpaid taxes
owing by the debtor on his personal account, 16 on the theory that when exer-
cising the delegated power to tax, the city is functioning in a sovereign
capacity and is entitled to the appendant prerogative.17 It can therefore be
argued that although the collection of the city's claim was not the collection
of a tax, it was nevertheless the exercise of a sovereign function which had
6 Gill & J. 205 (Md. 1834); Aetna Accident and Liability Co. v. Miller, 54 Mont. 377,
170 Pac. 760 (1918); Matter of Carnegie Trust Co., 206 N.Y. 390, 99 N. E. 1096
(1912) ; U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Rainey, 120 Tenn. 357, 113 S. W. 397 (1908).
Contra: Potter v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 101 Miss. 823, 58 So. 713 (1912); Middle-
sex County v. State Bank, 2 Stew. 268 (N.J. Eq. 1878); North Carolina Corp. Com.
v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 193 N. C. 513, 137 S. E. 587, 51 A. L. R. 1355 (1927);
State v. Harris, 2 Bail. Eq. 598 (S. C. 1831) (the Court said at p. 599: "It cannot
be, that the incidents of royalty are to adhere to the vestal of republicanism, when
she has trod the diadem of kings under her feet, and broken the scepter of pow;er.")
Cf. In re Devlin, 180 Fed. 170 (D. Kan. 1910). The state may waive the prerogative.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Rainwater, 173 Ark. 103, 291 S.W. 1003, 51 A. L. R. 1336
(1927). It has been held that there is no subrogation to the priority. U. S. Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. v. McFerson, 78 Colo. 338, 241 Pac. 728 (1925). Contra: Orem v.
Wrightson, 51 Md. 34 (1878); U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bramwell, 108 Ore.
261, 217 Pac. 332 (1923), 32 A.L.R. 846 (1924).
12. Minnesota v. Bell, 64 Minn. 400, 67 N. W. 212 (1896). Priority is granted to
debts due the United States by REv. STAT. § 3466, 31 U. S. C. § 191 (1934).
13. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bramwell, 12 F. (2d) 307 (D. Ore. 1926);
County of Glynn v. Brunswick Terminal Co., 101 Ga. 244, 28 S. E. 604 (1897) ; People
ex rel. Nelson v. Home State Bank, 338 Ill. 179, 170 N.E. 205 (1930); Bignell v.
Cummins, 69 Mont. 294, 222 Pac. 797 (1923), 36 A. L. R. 640 (1925); Boone County
v. Cantley, 330 Mo. 911, 51 S.W. (2d) 56 (1932); Matter of Northern Bank of
New York, 85 Misc. 594, 148 N.Y. Supp. 70 (Sup. Ct. 1914), aff'd on opinion below,
163 App. Div. 974, aff'd, 212 N.Y. 608, 106 N.E. 749 (1914) ; City of Sturgis v. Meade
County Bank, 38 S. D. 317, 161 N. W. 327 (1917); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Rainey, 120 Tenn. 357, 113 S. W. 397 (1908). Contra: City and County of Denver v.
Stengcr, 295 Fed. 809 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924).
14. In re Marathon Savings Bank, 198 Iowa 692, 196 N. W. 729, 200 N. W. 199
(1924); Bent v. Inhabitants of Hubbardston, 138 Mass. 99 (1884); Insurance Com-
mission v. Commercial Mutual Insurance Co., 20 R. I. 7, 36 Atl. 930 (1897).
15. Marshall v. New York, 254 U. S. 380 (1920); Matter of Carnegie Trust Co.,
206 N. Y. 390, 99 N. E. 1096 (1912) ; Matter of Niederstein, 154 App. Div. 238, 138
N. Y. Supp. 952 (2d Dep't 1912).
16. In re Ginsburg, 27 Misc. 745, 59 N. Y. Supp. 656 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Mixter
v. Mohawk Clothing Co., 155 N.Y. Supp. 647 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Matter of Atlas Iron
Construction Co., 19 App. Div. 415, 46 N. Y. Supp. 467 (1st Dep't 1897).
17. See Matter of Northern Bank of New York, 85 Misc. 594, 148 N.Y. Supp. 70
(Sup. Ct. 1914), aff'd on opinion below, 163 App. Div. 974, aff'd, 212 N.Y. 608, 106
N.E. 749. That this is the ratio decidendi of these cases is evident from the fact that
several of the cases cited in Mixter v. Mohawk Clothing Co., 155 N.Y. Supp. 647
(Sup. Ct. 1915) in support of the result are cases where state taxes were accorded
the priority of sovereignty.
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not ceased merely because the city's agent had received the funds. In Matter
of Northern Bank of New York,18 where the city had deposited funds from
tax collections in a bank which subsequently failed, it was held that when
the money had been paid to the city officials, the sovereign function had
ceased, and priority was therefore denied. Two distinctions are discernable.
First, the money in that case had actually passed through the hands of city
officials, and had been deposited to the city's account. Neither of these facts
was present in the instant case. On the contrary, the city was still in a posi-
tion where it had to take action to collect the money. It would seem that
the sovereign function should extend at least to the collection of debts arising
from its exercise. Second, in Matter of Northern Bank of New York, the
money was part of the general municipal funds; in the instant case the sales
tax receipts are required by the enabling act" to be earmarked for unem-
ployment relief. In upholding the enabling act over the constiiutional com-
plaint that it concerned a locality and had not been properly passed,2 0 the
Court of Appeals held in unmistakeable language that unemployment relief
was a state purpose, and that the city was only the agent of the state.
2 1 It
would seem reasonable to argue that when the city is thus engaged in a state
undertaking, the sovereign prerogative is attached to the money from the
time of its payment by the purchaser until its final disbursement. in pur-
suance of the so{,ereign objective. As the result of the decision would seem
to make money paid by the taxpayers for unemployment relief available to
the bankrupt personally so as to preserve assets in his estate for the benefit
of his creditors, priority might well have been allowed.
LiABILITY OF TELEPHONE COMPANY FOR SPECIAL DAMAGES ARISING
FRo FAILURE OF SERVICE*
THE DUTY of telephone and telegraph companies to use due care in the
transmission of messages may arise either from statutory or common law
obligations of the company as a public service corporation, or from contracts
with subscribers;' and liability, at least for nominal damages, or the amount
18. 85 Misc. 594, 148 N.Y. Supp. 70 (Sup. Ct. 1914), aff'd on opinion below, 163
App. Div. 974, aff'd, 212 N.Y. 608, 106 . F_. 749.
19. N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 815; N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 873.
20. The act involved was N. Y. Laws 1933, c. 815. Article XII, Sec. 2 of the
New York Constitution provides that the Legislature shall not pass any law relating
to the cities which is either special or local in terms or effect except on an emergency
message from the governor and a two-thirds vote in each house. The act in issue vras
not so passed.
21. New York Steam Corp. v. City of New York, 268 N.Y. 137, 197 N.E. 172
(1935).
*Emery v. Rochester Telephone Corp.. 271 N. Y. 306, 3 N. E. (2d) 434 (1936).
1. See Vinson v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 188 Ala. 292, 301, 66 So. 10D, 102
(1914); Mentzer v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 276 Mass. 478, 483, 177 N.E. 549,
551 (1931); Weld v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 199 N.Y. 88, 98, 92 N.E. 415, 418
(1910).
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paid for the service, will generally result from its breach.2 Where recovery is
sought for special damages, however, as for physical injury
3 or business loss, 4
the courts have encountered difficulty in determining the limits to which
such liability ought to extend.5 In a few jurisdictions, recovery is said to
depend on the form of the action brought by the injured party." Thus, if the
action is in contract, the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale7 applies, so that, unless
the parties had notice of the particular risks involved, only nominal damages
will be allowed ;8 but the liability in tort is deemed broader, and special dam-
ages may be recovered for all injuries proximately caused by defendant's
wrongful act, irrespective of notice or contemplation of the parties.9 The
present weight of authority seems to be opposed to a distinction based on
the form of the action,10 and the measure of damages is generally held to
be the same in tort and in contract.1 1 It is said that since the obligation in
tort invariably rises out of a contract, or rather a relationship created by
contract, the two theories of action are "inextricably interwoven", and the
2. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S. 444 (1888).
3. Southern Tel. Co. v. King, 103 Ark. 160, 146 S. W. 489 (1912); Glawson v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 9 Ga. App. 450, 71 S. E. 747 (1911) ; Cumberland Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Jackson, 95 Miss. 79, 48 So. 614 (1909).
4. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Carter, 181 Ark. 209, 25 S.W. (2d) 448 (1930);
Hamel v. Western Union Tel. Co., 233 App. Div. 77, 251 N. Y. Supp. 559 (3d Dep't
1931).
5. See Leonard v. The New York, Albany & Buffalo Electro-Magnetic Tel. Co.,
41 N.Y. 544, 566; 1 Am. Rep. 446, 452 (1870).
6. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Green, 153 Tenn. 59, 281 S. W. 778 (1926), 48 A. L. R.
318 (1927).
7. 9 Ex. 341 (1854).
8. Primrose v. Western Union Tel. Co.; 154 U.S. 1 (1893); McBride v. Sunset
Tel. Co., 96 Fed. 81 (C. C. W. D. Wash. 1899); Barrett v. New England Tel. & Tel.
Co., 80 N.H. 354, 117 AtI. 264 (1922).
9. Since the tort duty usually arises from a statute providing for a civil right of
action against telephone and telegraph companies, the courts have occasionally followed
the exact wording of these statutes and permitted recovery for all damages caused
by the failure of service, requiring merely that such damage be the proximate result
of the wrongful act. Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N.W. 1
(1895); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Green, 153 Tenn. 59, 281 S.W. 778 (1926);
i -ker v. Western Union Tel. Co., 134 Wis. 147, 114 N.W. 439 (1908). New York
has not adopted this broad interpretation of the statutory duty. See Kerr Steamship
Co. v. Radio Corp., 245 N.Y. 284, 157 N. E. 140 (1927), cert. dcnied, 275 U.S. 557
(1927).
10. The courts have so held, notwithstanding the presence of a statute conferring
a civil right of action on subscribers. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taylor, 94 Fla. 841,
114 So. 529 (1927); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743
(1930); Kerr Steamship Co. v. Radio Corp., 245 N.Y. 284, 157 N. E. 140 (1927); cf.
Pollock v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 289 Mass. 255, 194 N.E. 133 (1935).
11. \'estern Union Tel. Co v. Merritt, 55 Fla. 462, 46 So. 1024 (1908) ; Kerr
Steamship Co. v. Radio Corp., 245 N.Y. 284, 157 N.E. 140 (1927), (1927) 41 HARV.
L. REv. 256; see (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 759 (1931) 65 U.S. L. REv. 396, 398. Contra:
Cowan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 122 Iowa 379, 98 N. W. 281 (1904).
contract must, therefore. "define and limit" the tort.1" In such a cause of
action, sounding in contract and in tort, special damages may not be recov-
ered, by the weight of authority, unless both the elements of notice and prox-
imate cause are present. 13
Dealing with the precise problem for the first time, the New York Court
of Appeals recently adopted the prevailing point of view. The father of a
sick child, attempting to telephone for a doctor, was unable to obtain a
response from the operator, and it was alleged that the child died as a
result of the consequent delay in securing medical attention. The father.
as administrator, brought an action against the telephone company under
the New York Wrongful Death Statute,14 and, as a defense, the company
relied on a limitation of liability in its contract with plaintiff as a subscriber.
The lower court struck out this defense as against public policy. Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals refused to consider the legality of the defense.
but held instead, with three judges dissenting, that the complaint should be
dismissed because it failed to state a cause of action under the death
statute. 15 The reasoning of the court appears to have been that, since the
telephone company was unaware of the illness of plaintiff's child, it could
not have foreseen the consequences of its wrongful failure to act. If there
had been notice, plaintiff might have recovered, 0 provided he could have
established the faifure of service as the proximate cause of his child's death.i
T
Under the circumstances, such proof would have been difficult. The courts
have been quick to point out the presence of independent and intervening
agencies, and where failure of service has prevented the calling of a fire
12. Edd v. Western Union Tel. Co., 127 Ore. 500. 272 Pac. S95 (1928).
13. Southern Tel. Co. v. King. 103 Ark. 160, 146 S. W. 489 (1912) ; Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. Hodges, 146 Ark. 585, 228 S. W. 731 (1921) ; see Comment (1933) 28 ILL.
L REv. 105. If either notice or pro-ximate cause is lacking, no recovery for special
damages vill be allowed. Southwestern Bell TeL Co. v. Carter. 181 Ark. 209, 25
S.IvXl (2d) 448 (1930); Seifert v. Western Union TeL Co., 129 Ga. 181, 58 S.E. 699
(1907).
14. N. Y. Detedent Estate Law § I-o, providing for an action by an executor or
administrator for the recovery of pecuniary losses suffered by decedent's next of in
as a result of his death against one "who would have been liable to an action in favor
of the decedent by reason thereof had death not ensued" Althq~igh the court seems
to have intimated that plaintiff should have expressly alleged a cause of action in
decedent had she lived, such an allegation has never been required before in Ner. York
and has been held unnecessary in Philadelphia, AV. & B. R. R. v. State of Md. tse of
Sarah Bitzer, 58 IMd. 372 (1832'). Cf. Brown v. Duffalo State Line R. R., 22 X.Y.
191 (1860); McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 221, 94 N.E. 616 (1911);
In re Brennan's Account 160 App. Div. 401, 145 N.Y. Supp. 440 (2d Dep't 1914).
15. Emery v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 271 X. Y. 306, 3 X.E. (2d).434 (1936).
16. Cf. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Hodges, 146 Ark. 585. 223 S. V. 731 (1921);
Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sutton, 156 Ky. 191. 160 S. ,V. 949 (1913); Carter
v. Vestern Union Tel. Co.. 141 N. C. 374, 54 S. E. 274 (1906) : Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co. v. Carless, 127 Va. ".. 102 S. E. 569 (1920).
17. Cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ford. 10 Ga. App. 60G, 74 S.E. 70 (1912);
Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Allen, 146 S. XV 1065 (Te-, Civ. App. 1912).
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department,"' or a veterinary, 19 or a doctor, 20 and damage has ensued, it
has been held that the element of causation was too remote to support an
action.21 In the principal case, however, in spite of obvious problems of
causation, the court appears to have conceded this element arguendo, and
to have relied, instead, on the absence of notice of special risk.
In selecting this particular ground for its decision, 22 the Court of Appeals
conferred upon telephone companies virtual immunity from liability for
negligence. The requirement of notice of special risk was first developed
in the telegraph cases where it has practical application, since telegraph
messages are always read by an operator. But telephone companies can
seldom have knowledge of the special needs of individual subscribers. Where
the failure of service on which the complaint is based is the subscriber's
inability to reach the operator, it is obviously also impossible for him, in
most cases, to inform the company of the risk. For this reason, the require-
ment of actual notice in telephone cases may seem an unreasonable bar to
recovery. Being unable to obtain a legal remedy, subscribers are left
virtually unprotected from the hazards of faulty service. Although tele-
grams may be insured by "repeating" at a slight extra cost, insurance can
have no practical application to telephone calls, nor has it ever been suggested.
In view of' the fact that telephone companies advertise their availability for
emergency calls, 23 and that telephones are part of the normal emergency
equipment of a community, it might be argued that such companies ought
18. Volquardsen v. Iowa Tel. Co., 148 Iowa 77, 126 N. W. 928 (1910); Lebanon,
Louisville & Lexington Tel. Co. v. Lanham Lumber Co., 131 Ky. 718, 115 S. W. 824
(1909); Whitehead v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 190 N.C. 197, 129 S. E. 602 (1925).
19. Central Union Tel. Co. v. Swoveland, 14 Ind. App. 341, 42 N. E. 1035 (1896);
Duncan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 87 Wis.. 173, 58 N. W. 75 (1894). But cf. Peter-
son v. Monroe Indepcndent Tel. Co., 106 Neb. 181, 182 N. W. 1017 (1921).
20. Where failure of service has resulted in physical injury through the delayed
attendance of a physician, the courts have held the evidence of causal relationship too
remote to go to the jury. Seifert v. Western Union Tel. Co. 129 Ga. 181, 58 S. E.
699- (1907); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Reynolds, 139 Ga. 385, 77 S. E. 388
(1913); Evans' Adm'r v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 135 Ky. 66, 121 S. W. 959
(1909); Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Solomon, 54 Tex. Civ. App. 306, 117 S.W.
214 (1909); Deweese v. Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co., 144 S. W. 732 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1912). Contra: Glawson v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 9 Ga. App. 450,
71 S. E. 747 (1911), overruled by Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Reynolds, .supra.
Cf. cases cited notes 16 and 17, supra.
21. See Clay, The Liability of a Telephone Company for its Negligent Failure to
Furnish Promptly Service for Summoning a Physician in Case of Sickness (1914)
1 VA. L. REv. 337.
22. Although some reference was made in the opinion to the absence of physical
contact, it is doubtful whether this could have been relied on for the decision. Mitchell
v. Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896) relates solely to injuries resulting
from fright. There is no such element in this case, and, furthermore, the requirement
of physical contact has been liberally construed to permit recovery. Comstock v.
Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931); Sider v. Reid Ice Cream Co., 125 Misc.
835, 211 N.Y. Supp. 582 (2d Dep't 1925).
23. See N. Y. L.J., September 30, 1936, p. 922, col. 3.
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not to require special notice of risks, with the general nature of which they
are already aware. Although courts have never permitted recovery on the
basis of implied notice alone, such a rule would not place upon telephone
companies an undue burden of liability. Since New York does not recognize
mental anguish in telephone and telegraph cases,24 there could be no such
deluge of litigation as has flooded the courts of Texas and some of the
other southern states, 25 and in any event the requirement of proximate cause
would afford protection to the telephone companies and would permit the
courts flexibility in granting or denying recovery. To the extent that injured
subscribers would benefit thereby, such a rule would seem to be in accord
with the purpose of the various statutes in New York20 and other states-
which provide for a civil right of action against telephone companies.
Although cogent arguments may be advanced for the elimination of notice
as a prerequisite of recovery, the sounder rule would seem to be that adopted
in the principal case. By requiring notice, the courts can avoid the confused
issue of proximate cause. If this were made the sole basis of the action,
liability would be haphazard and unsatisfactory, and, because the connec-
tion between faulty service and injury is inevitably tenuous in telephone
cases,28 it is doubtful whether subscribers would derive any appreciable benefit
from the alternate rule, even conceding the possibility of more -frequent
recoveries. Certainly, it would be impossible under it to establish any dear-
cut rule of liability. Since Public Service Commissions would merely be
forced to raise rates in order to meet such incr..ased obligations, the imposi-
tion of liability in cases like the present one would involve no actual loss
to the telephone company, and would provide the management little incentive
to guard against mistakes which may be either unavoidable or else completely
unexplained, as in the principal case. And one may doubt the justification
for transferring the loss for such accidents to the public at large in the form
of higher rates. The damages for which a telephone company could conceiv-
ably be held liable are unlimited, especially in cases involving business loss,
and in this respect they differ from those of a common carrier, which can
normally be held responsible only for the value of the goods shipped. For
24. Curtin v. Western Union Tel. Co., 13 App. Div. 253, 42 N. Y. Supp. 1109 (1st
Dep't 1897).
25. See Note (1914) 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 206.
26. N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm. Law § 93, providing that where a telephone company
shall fail in the performance of its statutory obligations as a public service corpora-
tion, it "shall be liable to the person or corporation affected thereby for all loss, damage
or injury caused thereby or resulting therefrom". Although the New York courts have
virtually nullified the effect of this statute by requiring actual notice to the telegraph
company, see Kerr Steamship Co. v. Radio Corp. 245 N.Y. 284, 157 N.E. 140 (1927),
such a narrow construction is supported in other jurisdictions having similar statutes,
see note 10, supra.
27. FLA. Comp. GEN. LAWs A-T. (Skillman, 1927) § 6347; GA. Coon (1933)
c. 104, § 206; TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 3102; Wis. STAT. (1927) c. 180, § 19.
Even in those states permitting a liberal interpretation of such statutes it has b,en held
that damages are restricted to injuries proximately caused by the failure of service.
Fisher v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 Wis. 146, 96 N.%V. 545 (1903).
28. See cases cited supra note 20.
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this reason, it would be impossible to estimate the exact amount of the loss,
and in order to guard against eventualities, rates might have to be raised
to an extent which would seem to be out of all proportion to the benefit to
be obtained.
DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES UNDER LONG TERm LEASES*
A RAILROAD and its subsidiaries leased all their property to two other roads
for 999 years. The lease provided for the payment by the lessees of money
rental and other stipulated expenses of the lessors; in addition the lessees
agreed to repair and replace the leased property at their own expense, and
on termination of the lease to return it in substantially as good condition as
when received. Under the uniform system of accounts prescribed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission, depreciation on the original leased equip-
ment from the effective date of the lease, was currently accrued on the books
of the lessees. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, however, in com-
puting taxable net income for the years 1928-30 inclusive, refused to allow
the deduction of the depreciation thus charged off. On consolidated appeals
by one of the lessees' and the lessor, the Board of Tax Appeals held that
neither the lessor nor the lessee was entitled to a depreciation allowance, but
permitted the lessees to deduct in the year of retirement 2 the value of leased
property retired but not replaced. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, affirming the Board's decision, held, with Judge Parker con-
curring specially, that neither the lessor nor lessee railroad was entitled to a
reduction of gross income for depreciation of the original leased property,8
since the lessor had sustained no loss and the lessee had made no capital
investment.
4
*Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Commissioner, 81 F. (2d) 309 (C. C.A. 4th, 1936).
1. The Louisville and Nashville R. R., joint lessee with the Atlantic line, on whose
books one-half of the claimed depreciation on the leased property was charged off,
did not appeal from the Commissioner's ruling.
2. When the lessee failed to replace original leased property on retirement, he
credited the lessor with value at date of lease and offset such credits against charges
to the lessor in the value of additions and betterments, for which the lessee was en-
titled, under the lease, to reimbursement in bonds from the lessor. On a showing that
the lessee received bonds only for the difference between such charges and credits,
the Board permitted him to deduct the value of the retired leased property, as of the
date of the lease, less salvage and prior permitted depreciation, as rental payments.
31 B. T. A. 730, 738-740 (1934). This was not contested on appeal to the Circuit Court.
3. When, however, the lessee invests capital in replacements, he is entitled to depre-
ciation deductions over the useful life or the remaining term of the lease, whichever
is shorter. See Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 31 B. T. A. 730,
738 (1934); GEN. CouN. MEmo. 11933, XII-2 Cum. BULL. 52 (1933). He is not entitled
to depreciate additions and betterments, however, since he receives reimbursement for
these expenditures from the lessor. Id. at 736; see note 9, infra.
4. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 81 F. (2d) 309 (C. C. A. 4th,
1936), cert. denied, 80 Sup. Ct. (L. Ed.) 673 (April 6, 1936), rehearing denied, 80 Sup.
Ct. (L. Ed.) 787 (May 4, 1936).
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The depreciation deduction from gross income uniformly permitted by the
Revenue Acts since 19135 is an allowance for the consumption of capital
during the year, through the wear and tear of capital assets in excess of
ordinary repairs and maintenance.0 The deduction thus represents a contri-
bution of capital to offset a loss of capital,7 which is not taxable under the
16th Amendment.3 Accordingly, when the investor is subsequently to receive
a complete capital reimbursement for all loss suffered through depreciation
of his property, he is considered not to be entitled also to a tax-free increase
of capital via a statutory deduction. 9 On this principle, the decisions have
uniformly denied the lessor a depreciation deduction where, as in the present
case,' 0 the lessee has contracted to replace the leased property or to restore
its equivalent on termination of the lease." Under such circumstances, prop-
erty depreciation does not diminish the lessor's capital investment, and denial
of the deduction by the principal court seems clearly justified.
On the other hand, the courts have been equally firm in denying a depre-
ciation allowance to a lessee who has made no capital investment,2 even
where the long-term lease was regarded under state law as a conveyance
5. Also permitted under the Corporation Tax Law of 1909, 36 STAT. 113.
6. See United States v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295, 300 (1927); Lindheimer v. Illinois
Bell Telephone Co.- 292 U.S. 151, 167 (1934).
7. See City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 13 (1909) ; U.S. Treas.
Reg. 86, Art. 23(1)-i.
& See United States v. Blow and Chatfield-Taylor, 77 F. (2d) 141, 143 (C. C. A.
7th, 1935). But cf. Home, The Accrual Method of Calculating Taxable Net Income
(1931) 9 TAx MAG. 9, 12.
9. On the principle that the element of reimbursement defeats any deduction for
losses or expenses. Glendinning, McLeish & Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 61 F. (2d)
950 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); cf. New York, C. & St. L R. R. v. Helvering, 71 F. (2d)
956, 959 (App. D. C. 1934).
10. The actual obligation of the lessee was to return the leased property at the end
of the lease "in good order and condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted." The
covenant was interpreted by the Board, and apparently by the lessee also, as an obliga-
tion to restore property actuall3 equivalent in value. See Atlantic Coast Line R. R.
v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 31 B. T. A. 730, 735 (1934); but cf. Terminal Realty Corp.
v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 32 B. T. A. 623 (1935).
11. Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. Terre Haute Electric Co., 67 F. (2d) 697 (C. CA.
7th, 1933), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 624 (1934) ; Georgia Ry. & Electric Co. v. Comm'r
of Int. Rev., 77 F. (2d) 897 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 601 (1935);
A. Wilhelm Co., 6 B. T. A. 1 (1927). But where the lessee is not under obligation to
restore the equivalent of the leased property, the lessor is entitled to depredation
deductions. Richmond Belt Ry. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 13 B.T. A. 1291 (19.M).
12. Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U. S. 333 (1929) ; Brevoort Hotel Co. v. Reinecke, 35 F.
(2d) 51 (C. C. A. 7th, 1929); Belt Ry. of Chicago v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 36 F.
(2d) 541 (App. D. C. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 742 (1930); Tunnel R. R. of
St. L. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 61 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932), cert. denied, 2Z3
U.S. 604 (1933); New York Central R. R. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 79 F. (2d) 247
(C. C.A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 653 (1935) ; William J. Ostheimer, I B.T.A.
18 (1924) ; Ohio Cloverleaf Dairy Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 13 B. T. A. 1320 (1928);
aff'd without opinion, 34 F. (2d) 1022 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of the fee.' 3 If the premise is accepted that the principal function of the
deduction is to maintain the integrity of the taxpayer's original investment,
4
the lessee is refused the allowance under the theory that his capital is not
diminished by depreciation of the leased property. Likewise, if emphasis
is shifted to the view that the depreciation charge is incurred as an operating
expense for the primary purpose of determining the correct cost of opera-
tions,15 the lessee is still not granted the allowance, on the ground that ex-
haustion of the lessor's capital in leased property does not represent an
"actually sustained" expense of operation to the lessee. The existence of an
obligation to restore the equivalent of the leased property on termination of
the lease is held not to alter the situation-for the expenditure is considered
at most a future one, and the statutory deduction has been interpreted to
require an "actual and present" loss.16 Only where the lessee actually invests
capital 17 in improvements' or replacements, 19 or where he makes a separable
purchase of depreciable property on the land leased,20 is he thereafter allowed
13. See Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U. S. 333, 337 (1929).
14. This has been termed the "engineering" viewpoint on depreciation as distinguished
from that of the "accountant," where stress is laid on the necessity of the deduction
to determine true cost of production. 2 KEsTER, ACCOUNTING THEORY AND PRAcTICE
(3d ed. 1933) 245-246. The two standpoints represent a difference in emphasis rather
than a conflict of views.
15. See note 14, supra. For an exposition of the "accountant's" theory of depreciation,
see HATFIELD, ACCOUNTING (1928) 131, 133-135; Brandeis J., dissenting, in United Rail-
ways v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 260 et seq. (1930).
16. Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U. S. 333 (1929).
17. While the courts have consistently demanded an initial capital outlay before
conceding a deduction for depreciation, [cf. Rose v. Grant, 39 F. (2d) 338 (C. C. A.
5th, 1930) (right of a life tenant to deduct 'depreciation, distinguishable because of the
freehold interest)] a capital investment in the same sense has not been required in
cases involving depletion, although the function of the allowance in each case is identical.
United States v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295 (1927); Pugh v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 49 F.
(2d) 76 (C. C.A. 5th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 642 (1931). For a general dis-
cusion of the depletion allowance, see Beveridge, Depletion of Oil and Gas Properties
(1936) 14 TAX MAG. 67; 2 PAUL & MERTENS, THE LAW OF INCOME TAXATION (1934)
682 et seq. In permitting the non-investing lessees of mineral property to deduct deple-
tion allowances, the courts have apparently felt that the holders of mineral leases were
entitled to special treatment, in view of the fact that with the removal of each mineral
unit the operating right and business existence of the lessee under the lease is cor-
respondingly diminished. Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U. S. 364 (1925); see
Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U. S. 333, 336 (1929); 2 PAUL AND MERTENS, Op. Cit. supra, at
688. Depletion deductions are apportioned between lessor and lessee under the Revenue
Acts since 1918 inclusive.
18. Duffy v. Central R. R. of N. J., 268 U. S. 55 (1925); Gladding Dry Goods
Co., 2 B. T. A. 336 (1925). Even a tenant at will may deduct depreciation on improve-
ments. Simons Brick Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 45 F. (2d) 57 (C. C.A. 9th, 1930),
cert. denied, 283 U. S. 834 (1931).
19. See note 3, supra.
20. Cogar v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 44 F. (2d) 554 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930); G. S.
Stewart Co., 2 B.T.A. 1016 (1925).
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a deduction for depreciation.2 1 Similarly, where the court believes that the
lease is merely a device in aid of a borrowing scheme and that the technical
lessee remains in effect an owner-mortgagor, the lessee may charge off
depreciation on the leased property?1
Although the depreciation deduction, under similar circumstances, has been
denied particular lesseesm and also particular lessors,24 the issues, in the
instant case, are dramatized by the fact that the decision of the court is the
first in which the allowance has been refused both lessor and lessee under
the same lease, In the light of the flat statutory provisions for the deduc-
tion, hortatory in form,2 6 the result reached appears to be paradoxical. Under
pertinent Treasury regulations, however, neither party is penalized in the
amount of the deductions to which he will potentially be entitled. Upon ex-
piration of 999 years, the lessor will be permitted to depreciate the value of
the leased property, as of the date of the lease, over the remaining useful life
of equivalent property returned to him ;. and the lessee will be entitled to
deduct accelerated depreciation in the closing years of the lease.2
Although both the lessor and the lessee can thus take their deductions,
postponement of the lessee's allowance until the closing years of the lease
seems to work hardship upon him. The dictates of correct accounting, as rec-
ognized by the Interstate Commerce Commission,2 call for a readjustment of
the timing and lasis of the lessee's depreciation deductions. By permitting
the lessee immediately to accrue depreciation of the originally leased property
over the remainder of its useful life, in place of taking accelerated deprecia-
tion on replacements made in the dosing years of the lease, the net income
of the lessee during the early and the closing years of the lease would be
21. For a general discussion of the allowance to lessees, see Lavery, Some Phases
of the Deduction for Depreciation under Long Term Leases (1929) 3 U. oF C n. L.
Ruv. 444.
_2. Comm'r of Int. Rev. v. H. F. Neighbors Realty Co., 81 F. (2d) 173 (C. C.A. 6th,
1936); F. and R. Lazarus & Co., 32 B. T. A. 633 (1935). But ef. City Nat. Ban:
Bldg. Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 34 B. T. A., March 10, 1936.
23. See note 12, mpra.
24. See note 11, stpra.
25. But such a situation was discussed arguendo in New York Central R. R. v.
Comm'r of Int. Rev., 79 F. (2d) 247 (C.C.A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 653
(1935), although the case only involved the rights of a lessee.
26. "In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions . . . a reason-
able allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear of property used in the trade or
business, including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence." Revenue Act of 1923,
45 STAT. 799, 800, 26 U. S. C. § 23 (1934).
27. GEN. COUN. MEMto. 11933, XII-2 Cum. BULL. 52 (1933); see 2 PAuL AND
MERTEN.s, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME T.A XATION- (1934) 626.
28. See note 3, stipra. The accelerated depreciation is granted the lessee in lieu of
depreciation deductions denied on the originally leased property. However, an exact
equivalent is not substituted insofar as retirement without replacements are made during
the lease for which the lessee is obligated to reimburse the lessor and entitled to take
deductions. See note 32, infra.
29. See Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 81 F. (2d) 309, 310
(C.C.A. 4th, 1936).
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more accurately reflected than under the legally accepted scheme whereby
such net income is swelled in the early period and contracted in the later.
It is true that the lessee made no present investment in the property acquired
from the lessor in the sense of an outright purchase, and that title to this
property remains in the lessor. Nevertheless, realistically viewed, it is the
lessee's property,30 he must replace it when worn out, and its depreciation
during useful life is incurred in producing the income upon which he is
taxed."1 In substance, the transaction amounts to a purchase of the property
upon deferred credit in the form of an obligation to return to the lessor
equivalent property upon termination of the lease.32 The fact that this pay-
ment is delayed3 3 and indirect, does not alter the fundamental accounting
requirement that depreciation must be accrued over the useful life of pur-
chased capital assets in order truly to reflect the income of that period
4
While a determination of what is good accounting does not always solve the
question of what the taxing statutes permit,3 5 the stipulation of the Revenue
Act that the taxpayer's method of accounting shall "clearly reflect income"
must be given due weight386 The court's refusal, therefore, to permit the
depreciation deductions during useful life can be attributed only to reluctance
to deviate from cash-receipts-and-disbursements accounting in the direction
of the accrual system, and to an adherence to the technical concepts of the
law of property with its emphasis on the situs bf title instead of the practical
indicia of ownership.
However, if the lease is to be literally construed as conferring on the
lessee merely the interest of a holder for years, he should still be entitled
from both legal and accounting standpoints to anticipate his future liability
by yearly deductions for a restoration reserve37 over the useful life of the
30. See note 22, supra, for cases ii which the court looked through the form to
the substance of a leasing transaction in holding that the technical lessee was the real
owner for purposes of depreciation.
31. See Judge Parker concurring specially in Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Comm'r
of Int. Rev., 81 F. (2d) 309, 312 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936).
32. This obligation is reduced to the extent that the lessee reimburses the lessor
for retirements without subsequent replacement (including retirements of originally
leased property, of additions and betterments, and of" all replacements of eithr) ; and
is increased to the extent that the lessor reimburses the lessee for additions and better-
ments.
33. The Board held that the lessor's bonds, which amounted to mere promises to
pay at termination of the lease, and then without interest, were a present capital reim-
bursement for additions and betterments. See note 3, supra. Consistency would appear
to require an analogous construction of the lessee's promise to restore equivalent property
after 999 years as amounting to an effective, present capital reimbursement for the
original leased property.
34. HATFIELD, ACCOUNTING (1928) 130 et seq.
35. See Weiss v. Wiener, 279 U.S. 333, 335 (1929); 1 PAUL AND MERTENS, Tim
LAw or FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (1934) 576; 2 id. at 622-623.
36. 45 STAT. 805 (1928), 26 U. S.C. §41 (1934).
37. Hatfield argues that the use of the term "reserve" in referring to a liability is
terminologically incorrect. "Instead of representing something held in reserve (from
surplus) it represents something that is nonexistent". HATFIELD, ACCOUNTING (1928)
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property acquired under the lease.38 In view of the lessee's obligation to
replace-and restore the leased property, the annual wear and tear of equipment
should still be considered an operating expense properly attributable to the
earnings of the taxable period, under the accounting requirement of including
related items of income and expense in the same fiscal period.39 It may be
true that reserves are not favored by the courts or the Treasury,40 but
reserves for the amortization of bond discounts, a future liability of con-
tractual origin, have been held proper and necessary in order clearly to
reflect the taxpayer's income.4 ' The lessee's liability under his covenant
seems definite enough,4 2 and even if he were able to escape his obligation, the
government is normally in a position to recoup, merely by adding to its
taxable income for the ensuing year the amount of the deductions for depre-
ciation or restoration reserve previously allowed.4 3 If such annual allowances
are not permitted in one form or the other, the distortion of the lessee's in-
come under the plan approved by the court creates the possibility of injustice
to the taxpayer in the contingency that accelerated depreciation in the closing
years of the lease should exceed taxable income. With the elimination of
the net loss provision of the Revenue Acts14 and the increasingly heavy cor-
porate taxes now in effect, such overpayments may severely penalize a
leased road.
298-302. But see 2 KsrzR, AccouxixG TnEoRY AD PRAcricE (3d ed. 1933) 571-
578.
38. See Roberts, Depreciation Allowances to Lessccs (1929) 7 TAx MAO. 221. The
Interstate Commerce Commission requires deductions in order adequately to reflect
earnings for rate making purposes.
39. United States v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 422 (1926); see Gaskill, Accounting
Methods and the Income Tax (1930) 8 TAx MAG. 365.
40. Gude Brothers. Kiefer and Co., 2 B. T. A. 1029 (1925) ; see 1 PAuL AxD Mm ns,
THE LAw OF FEDERAL IXcOME TAx.kTio. (1934) 583.
41. Helvering v. Union Pac. R. R., 293 U.S. 282 (1934), noted (1935) 9 Sr. JoH's
L. REv. 437; New York Central R. R. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 79 F. (2d) 247 (C. C.A.
2d, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 653 (1935). Furthermore, reserves have been per-
mitted in anticipation of an admitted liability to respond in damages for breach of
contract, even where the amount and date of te liability were uncertain. Fraser
Brick Co., 10 B.T.A. 1252 (1928).
42. Assignment of the lease does not discharge the lessee's obligation, although his
liability, of course, might be voided by agreement with the lessor. The Court held
the lessees covenant and liability absolute in order to bar deduction by the lessor,
but viewed it as contingent to deny the allowance to the lessee!
43. The Treasury has provided for such procedure in the case of depletion deductions
allowed a lessor on an advance bonus payment. "In such case, if there is no produc-
tion from the leased premises, the taxpayer must restore the amount of deductions to
his income as of the year of termination of the lease." Gm. Cou. MEao. 14448,
XIV-17-7383, p. 4 (1935).
44. This provision wras repealed June 16, 1933. 4S ST r. 209 (1933), 26 U.S.C. § 23
(1934).
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BANKER'S RIGHT TO SET OFF DEPOSIT AGAINST UNMATURED
NOTE OF INSOLVENT CUSTOMER*
THE MAJORITY of states either by statute' or judicial decision 2 permit a
bank, upon learning that its depositor has become insolvent, to apply de-
posits against unmatured obligations of the insolvent depositor. Since under
this rule the bank determines the insolvency of the customer,3 a number
of states, fearing to give so much discretion to the bank, do not permit the
set-off until there has been an adjudication of insolvency.4 The majority
rule seems sounder, for it permits the bank to protect itself more expedi-
tiously, but does not unduly prejudice other creditors over whom the bank
is preferred under either rule ;5 and the depositor who is not in fact insolvent
has an adequate remedy for an arbitrary or unreasonable set-off by the bank.0
In those states which do not permit the set-off before an adjudication
of insolvency, special circumstances are usually excepted from the force of
the rule. Thus, if the depositor failed to disclose his true financial condition
and was insolvent when the obligation was created, a finding of fraud seems
unavoidable.7 This would permit the bank to rescind the transaction im-
mediately upon discovery of the fraud and set off the unmatured obligation
against the deposit 8 even without notice to the depositor.9
*Harding v. Broadway National Bank, 200 N.E. 386 (Mass. 1936).
1. N. Y. DEBTOR AND CREDITOR LAW § 151; see Updike v. Manufacturers' Trust
Co., 243 App. Div. 15, 16, 275 N.Y. Supp. 716, 717 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd, 267 N.Y.
528, 196 N.E. 563 (1935).
2. United States v. Bank of Shelby, 68 F. (2d) 538 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Kane
v. First National Bank of El Paso, 56 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) ; Minge v. First
National Bank of Birmingham, 191 Ala. 271, 68 So. 141 (1915); Parker v. First
National Bank of Muldrow, 96 Okla. 70, 220 Pac. 39 (1923); 7 ZOLLMAx, BANKS
AND BANKING (1936) § 4471; notes (1926) 43 A. L. R. 1325, (1927) 51 A. L. R. 1477.
3. Insolvency in this connection means that the depositor cannot pay his debts as
they fall due. Parker v. First National Bank of Muldrow, 96 Okla. 70, 220 Pac. 39
(1923). The same court suggested that this rule may be too rigorous. Zollinger v.
First National Bank of Oklahoma City, 126 Okla. 182, 259 Pac. 141 (1926).
4. Sullivan v. The Merchants National Bank, 108 Conn. 497, 144 Atl. 34 (1928);
Wiley v. Bunker Hill National Bank, 183 Mass. 495, 67 N. E. 655 (1902); Rogosin
v. City Trust Co. of Passaic, 107 N.J. Eq. 79, 151 AUt. 834 (Ch. 1930); Kurtz v.
County National Bank of Clearfield, 288 Pa. 472, 136 Atl. 789 (1927).
5. Thus under the Federal Bankruptcy Act the bank may set off before the petition
is filed. Studley v. Boylston National Bank, 229 U.S. 523 (1913). Because the bank
would receive a preference over other creditors, a set-off is not allowed even after
the appointment of a receiver. Blum Bros. v. Girard National Bank, 248 Pa. 148, 93
Ati. 940 (1915).
6. Monier v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 82 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
7. In re K. Marks & Co., 218 Fed. 453 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914); (1935) 44 YALE L. J.
690, 692.
8. Bradley v. Seaboard National Bank, 167 N.Y. 427, 60 N. E. 771 (1901) ; Andrews
v. The Artisans' Bank, 26 N.Y. 298 (1860); Paoli v. East River National Bank,
92 Misc. 153, 155 N.Y. Supp. 245 (Sup. Ct. 1915) ; Mann v. Franklin Trust Co., 158
App. Div. 491, 143 N.Y. Supp. 660 (2d Dep't 1913).
9. Wolf v. National City Bank of New York, 170 App. Div. 565, 156 N.Y. Supp.
575 (1st Dep't 1915).
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Furthermore, in states which adhere to the minority rule, the bank may
protect itself by specific agreement with the depositor.10 Such agreements
are usually found in the provisions of the credit statement which the bank
requires to be filled out and signed when the customer applies for a loan."x
The credit statement ordinarily contains a summary of the financial condition
of the applicant, and printed provisions to the effect that the customer is sub-
mitting a true statement of his financial condition and that the bank may
declare any claim against the customer immediately due and payable if it
appears that the customer has misrepresented his financial condition, has
failed to notify the bank of any material change, or is insolvent.12 Provisions
such as these have been interpreted to be part of the loan agreement and
to permit the bank to set off according to the provisions of the credit state-
ment 13 even in states where insolvency of itself does not give a right of
set-off.14 The protection thus afforded the bank seems reasonable in light
of the importance of accurate credit statenlents to a bank in making loans. 15
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which has adhered to the
minority rule requiring an adjudication of insolvency before a bank can
set off deposits against the unmatured obligation of the insolvent,10 recently
reached a result which denies the bank the protection of set-off under cir-
cumstances which are normally considered exceptions to the minority rule:
undisclosed insolvency at the time the loan was made, and a special agree-
ment permitting a set-off in the event of insolvency, or on the discovery of
untruth in the customer's statement. A company engaged in selling auto-
mobiles desired to open a commercial account in the defendant bank. Before
making the loan, the bank required the company to fill out and sign a
credit statement similar to those already described. Thereafter the defendant
bank made loans to the company from time to time in compliance with their
loan agreement, taking notes as collateral security; and the customer sup-
plied up-to-date credit statements, the last of which was as of July 31, 1931.
Shortly thereafter the company became insolvent, but did not disclose this
fact to the bank, which on June 8, 1932, renewed a note of $2,800 for one
month. Three days later the bank discovered the company's insolvency and
10. Wright v. Seaboard Steel & Manganese Corp., 272 Fed. 807 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921) ;
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Morris, 16 F. (2d) 845 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927); South-
wark National Bank v. Beck, 98 Pa. Super. 213 (1930).
11. K IFFi, THE PRACTICAL WoRK OF A BAzNK (8th ed. 1934) 320, 323, 3-5.
12. For examples of these provisions in credit statements, see Harding v. Broadway
National Bank of Chelsea, 200 N.E. 386, 387 (Mass. 1936); Corn Exchange National
Bank v. Locher, 151 Fed. 764 (C. C. A. 3d, 1907).
13. Updike v. Manufacturers' Trust Co., 243 App. Div. 15, 275 N.Y. Supp. 716
(1st Dep't 1934), aff'd, 267 N. Y. 528, 196 N.E. 563 (1935); See Corn Exchange
National Bank v. Locher, 151 Fed. 764, 766 (C. C.A. 3d, 1907).
14. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Morris, 16 F. (2d) 845 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927);
Southwark National Bank v. Beck, 98 Pa. Super. 213 (1930); Steiner v. Mutual
Alliance Trust Co. of New York, 139 App. Div. 645, 124 N. Y. Supp. 184 (1st Dep't
1910) (Decided before passage of N. Y. DrmaOR Aim CREDrron Lvw § 151).
15. Kniffim, op. cit. supra note 11, 359, 377.
16. Wiley v. Bunker Hill National Bank, 183 Mass. 495, 67 N. F. 655 (1902).
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immediately notified the company that it was setting off against the note
the balance of $1,673.64 standing in the company's account. Shortly there-
after, the company's petition for dissolution was filed and the receiver brought
suit against the bank for breach of contract, asking as damages the balance
of the account which the bank had charged off against the note. The bank
maintained that the credit statement gave it the right to accelerate the note
and to take the set-off. The lower court found that the company had been
insolvent for a long time prior to the renewing of the last note and that
the bank had relied on the credit statements in making its loans, but held
that the insolvency did not give the bank the right of set-off, the provisions
of the credit statement not being incorporated into the note so as to give
the bank such a right. On appeal, the findings and judgment of the lower
court were affirmed.1
7
The issue of whether the fraudulent conduct on the part of the company
by itself justified the set-off may not have been pressed by counsel, and
certainly was not decided by the court, although the undisputed facts and
findings of the court should clearly permit the set-off on this ground.18 Fur-
thermore, the refusal of the court to construe the provisions of the credit
statement and the note as parts of a single contract, so as to allow the
set-off, seems entirely inconsistent with the previous cases on this point.'"
The court appears to have failed to treat the loan agreement between a
commercial bank and its customer realistically. The loan agreement, made
against the background of a current account, may well be considered to con-
sist of an exchange of the following promises, implied in fact from the
observed usage of the business community, and here made concrete in the
documents which passed betveen the parties.20 The customer promises to
pay at the end of the agreed period, not the face value of any one of the
notes given by him, but the amount of the debit balance then standing in
his current account. The bank promises to make loans by accepting, and
perhaps by renewing, the customer's notes, and then by honoring the cus-
tomer's checks against the customer's credit balance, including the amount
of the customer's notes less discount, until the expiration of the agreed
period.21 Moreover, this promise by the bank may be subject to .implied
conditions, one of which is that the bank may terminate the loan agreement
at once if, before the end of the loan period, the customer becomes insolvent.
17. Harding v. Broadway National Bank of Chelsea, 200 N. E. 386 (Mass. 1936).
18. See cases supra, note 8.
19. See cases mipra, note 13.
20. Moore and Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the Debiting
of Direct Discounts (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 381, 389. If the action were on the note it
is probably true that under the parole evidence rule extrinsic evidence would not be
admissible to vary the time of maturity expressed in the note. Hall v. Bank, 173 Mass.
16, 53 N.E. 154 (1899); NORTON, BILLS AND NoTEs (4th ed. 1914) 109; 5 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE (1923) 337. However, in an action, as in the present case, for the bank's
breach of the loan agreement in failing to pay over the depositor's credit balance,
evidence of the terms of the loan agreement should be admissible. Roe v. Bank of
Versailles, 167 Mo. 406, 67 S. W. 303 (1902).
21. Moore and Sussman, op. cit. supra note 20, 395.
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The majority rule in effect recognizes this conditione and the provisions
of the credit statement in the present case do no more than make it express.
Under the rule of the present case, the only way such conditions may be
made effective is apparently by incorporating the acceleration conditions
printed on credit statements into the note by specific reference.
REPUDIATION OF DISABILITY INSURANCE CLAUSES
Ax INSURA.NcE company under a typical disability clause in a life insurance
policy, which provided for waiver of premiums and an agreed monthly income
in the event of total and permanent disability, denied, after paying monthly
benefits for about two years, that the insured was any longer so disabled.
Upon refusal by the insured to resume the payment of premiums and after
the expiration of a term of grace, the insurer declared the policy lapsed upon
its records, without, however, notifying the insured. In an action by the
insured for the total value of the benefits which would have been payable
to him during the period of his life expectancy, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that there had been no repudiation of the insurer's obli-
gation, since it had acted in good faith in denying its liability within the terms
of the contract, but only a partial present breach. There could consequently
be no recovery beyond the benefits accrued at the commencement of the
action, which were less than the required jurisd:ctional amount in the federal
courts, so that the defendant's demurrer should be sustained.1
Prior to the decision in Fcdcral Life Insurance Company v. Rascoe2 no
federal and few state courts had recognized a right in an insured to collect
future benefits under such contracts where there had been a disavowal of
liability by the insurer.3 Some courts simply followed the rule that there
can be no recovery of benefits which have not accrued under a contract
which has been completely performed by the plaintiff.4 In the Rascoe case
22. "A banker has ordinarily no right to apply the deposit account to a note not
yet due because it is contrary to his obligation to honor checks, but in case of super-
vening insolvency by the weight of authority that right arises:' Kane v. First National
Bank of "I Paso, 56 F. (2d) 534, 538 (C. C.A. 5th, 1932).
*New York Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672 (1936).
1. Ibid., re,,'g Viglas v. New York Life Ins. Co., 78 F. (2d) 829 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935),
and affirming the judgment of the District Ctuprt fcr the District of Massachusetts.
2. 12 F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 722 (1926).
3. The Roscoe case was apparently the first in the federal courts involving repudiation
of a disability policy. The cases in the state courts are collected in Ncte (1932) 81
A. LR. 379.
4. Puckett v. National Annuity Ass'n, 134 Mo. App. 501, 114 S. IV. 1039 (1903);
Supreme Tent Knights of .Maccabees v. Cox, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 365, 60 S. NV. 971
(1901); see Note (1932) 81 A. L. R. 379; cf. 3 ,VImusroi;, Co?,rntcrs (1920) § 1330.
This limitation, inspired by the distinction in Roehra v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 17 (1899),
between unilateral and bilateral contracts with respect to anticipatory breach, was no
doubt due in part to the vigorous objections of many authorities to the entire doctrine
of anticipatory breach. Greenway v. Gaither, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5,788 (C. C. D. Md.
1853) ; Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530 (1874) ; see Williston, Repudiation of Contracts
(1901) 14 HAv. L. Rzv. 317, 428.
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the Circuit Court of Appeals, endeavoring to avoid this limitation, concluded
through a process of rather strained logic that a similar contract fell within
the rule applicable to mutually executory agreements: the proofs of continued
disability required by the policy were construed not as conditions precedent,
but as obligations "which may be enforced by refusal to pay", though con-
cededly not by action on the part of the company. The decision, however,
has been expressly and consistently disapproved by the lower federal as well
as by several state courts.6 Recovery has been opposed on various grounds.
Some courts have held without more that "there can be no anticipatory breach
of a unilateral contract", 7 assuming, perhaps inaccurately, that an alleged
breach of this sort is an anticipatory one,8 or have decided, more elaborately,
that the doctrine of anticipatory breach does not apply to contracts for the
payment of money in future instalments which have been completely executed
by the parties on one side.9 The objection has been made in some instances
that, when the damages demanded are the full value of the insurance con-
tract, to be computed necessarily by the use of actuarial data, the amount
is so uncertain as to be arbitrary and unfair.10 The insurer's paying a lump
sum rather than periodic instalments during disability has been said in other
cases to defeat the intention of the contracting parties.1 And finally, the
recovery of future benefits has been denied on the ground that the refusal
to pay accrued instalments is not a breach of future contingent obligations,
but a breach only of a present duty. 12
In this most recent disapproval of the Rascoe case, the Court, while averse
to the "mechanical application of a uniform formula",13 is perhaps crystal-
lizing a new one in its use of good faith as a criterion for distinguishing
5. Federal Life Ins. Co. v. Rascoe, 12 F. (2d) 693, 696 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926); cf.
RESTATEE NT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 318; see Comment (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 263.
6. Mobley v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 74 F. (2d) 588, 590 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935), and
cases there cited, aff'd, 295 U. S. 632 (1935).
7. Cobb v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 4 Cal. (2d) 565, 573, 51 P. (2d) 84, 88
(1935), citing 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1328; Parks v. Md. Casualty Co.,
59-F. (2d) 736 (W.D. Mo. 1932) semnble. Contra: Pollack v. Pollack, 46 S.W. (2d)
292 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932); see Comment (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 263.
8. See note 21, infra.
9. Kithcart v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1 F. Supp. 719 (W. D. Mo. 1932); Rish-
miller v. Prudential Ins. Co., 192 Minn. 348, 353, 256 N. W. 187, 189 (1934) ; cf.
Manufacturers' Furniture Co. v. Cantrell, 172 Ark. 642, 290 S.W. 353 (1927). But
see Pollack v. Pollack, 46 S.W. (2d) 292, 295 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932) ; 3 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (1920) §1328.
10. Menssen v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1933); Howard
v. Benefit Ass'n of Railway Employees, 239 Ky. 465, 39 S. W. (2d) 657 (1931). But
cf. Pierce v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. R. Co., 173 U. S. 1, 16 (1899).
11. Smith v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n, 10 F. Supp. 110 (W. D.
Okla. 1933); Mid-Continent Life Ins. Co. v. Christian, 164 Okla. 161, 23 P. (2d) 672
(1932) ; Donlen v. Fid. & Cas. Co., 117 Misc. 414, 192 N.Y. Supp. 513 (Sup. Ct.
1921) (before Rascoe case).
12. Brix v. People's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 Cal. (2d) 446, 41 P. (2d) 537 (1935);
cf. Huffman v. Martin, 226 Ky. 137, 10 S. W. (2d) 636 (1928).
13. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U. S. 672, 681 (1936).
(Vol. 46
1936] NOTES
repudiation of a contract from disavowal of liability within its terms 1 4 The
early decisions defining repudiation insisted only that it must be absolute
and unequivocal.1 5 Later, in cases involving a sincere dispute as to the con-
struction of the terms of a contract, some courts, following Mr. Justice
Holmes' consideration of the factor of good faith in an early Massachusetts
case,'0 held that the promisee could not treat the contract as at an end.
1T
The view, however, that the denial in good faith of liability under an unambig-
uous disability insurance clause is not a legal repudiation, while it has become
increasingly popular, is comparatively recent,' 8 and in most instances -its
justification is not considered by the courts.' 0 Its acceptance in this case led
to the conclusion that the insurance company was not denying its duty to
pay monthly benefits if certain conditions precedent existed, but only that
those conditions did exist.20 Nevertheless, whether or not such a disavowal in
good faith makes for a technical repudiation, its effect may be no less a
deprivation of the insured's benefit payments than would be the effect of
a technical repudiation. The insurer's refusal to continue benefits, in good
14. The Circuit Court of Appeals, construing the complaint as alleging an unquali-
fied denial of all liability by the insurer, did not discuss the good faith factor; the case
was, of course, decided on a demurrer to the complaint. Viglas v. N. Y. Lifq Ins. Co.,
78 F. (2d) 829 (C: C. A. 1st, 1935). In Mobley v. New York Life Ins. Co., 295 U.S.
632 (1935), the Court had also denied that there had been a repudiation of a disability
insurance clause where the insurer had shown good faith, but that case was distinguish-
able. See N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U. S. 672, 678 (1936).
15. Smoot's Case, 15 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872) ; Dingley v. Oler, 117 U.S. 490 (18M);
3 WiL.usTox, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1324.
16. Daley v. People's Bldg., Loan & Savings Ass'n, 178 Mass. 13, 59 N.E. 452
(1901). The association notified the plaintiff in good faith that his stock was for-
feited. The suit, however, was for rescission, and the possibility of a suit to enforce
the contract was expressly left open.
17. Kimel v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 71 F. (2d) 921 (C. C.A. 10th, 1934), (1935)
35 COL L. REv. 105; Southern Publishing Ass'n v. Clements Paper Co., 139 Tenn.
429, 201 S. W. 745 (1918) ; Bare v. Victoria Coal & Coke Co., 73 NV. Va. 632, CO S. E.
941 (1914). Contra: Armstrong v. St. Paul & Pac. Coal Co., 48 Minn. 113, 50 N.V.
1029 (1892); De Mille Co. v. Casey, 115 Misc. 646, 189 N. Y. Supp. 275 (Sup. Ct.
1921); Clausen v. Canada Timber & Lands, Ltd., [1923] 4 D.L.R. 751 (P. C.).
18. W yll v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 483 (N. D. Te. 1933) ; Jefferson
Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Slaughter, 190 Ark. 402, 79 S. IV. (2d) 58 (1935) ; Ind. Life
Endovaent Co. v. Reed, 54 Ind. App. 450, 103 N.E. 77 (1913); cf. Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Marsh, 186 Ark. 861, 56 S. NV. (2d) 433 (1933). Contra: Protective Mut. Life
Ins. Ass'n v. Duke, 91 S. NV. (2d) 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); cf. Ill. Bankers' Life
Ass'n v. Armstrong, 100 Ind. App. 696, 710, 192 N. E. 901, 907 (1934) (declaration
of lapse held evidence by which jury "could well have found" repudiation).
19. E.g., National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Whitfield, 186 Ark. 198, 53 S.V.
(2d) 10 (1932); Robbins v. Travelers Ins. Co., 151 Misc. 151, 269 N.Y. Supp. 841
(Sup. Ct. 1934). Actually there is no question of an intentional abandonment in most
cases.
20. An actual declaration of lapse would, of course, amount to a denial of the
insurer's duty to pay benefits even if the conditions precedent did exist, unless the lapse
were conditioned on reinstatement upon a showing that the company's judgment had
been in error.
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faith or bad, would seem clearly to have been a partial present breach of the
contract here-not strictly an anticipatory breach, as the Court observed 21
-which effected a "frustration of the ends it was expected to subserve", 22
and consequently went to the essence of the contract. 23  It is poor con-
solation for a person who is presumably totally and permanently disabled
that there remains to him the benefit of the stipulated cash surrender, paid
up policy or extension of time privileges. It would seem more equitable,
if the effect is the same, to treat the good or bad faith of the insurer not
as a conclusive guide, but as one factor in determining the reparation to be
awarded in a particular case.
At the same time, although the ends of a contract have been frustrated
by the insurer's treating it as lapsed, it does not follow necessarily that the
insured, in order to be given full reparation, should recover the total present
value of all the benefits that would have been payable to him had the policy
remained in force. An immediate award of future benefits seems an unjust
penalty for a test of liability which may have been made in good faith,
24
particularly with respect to a type of insurance which has caused its issuers
increasingly great losses.25 A judgment based upon actuarial data is, more-
over, at best highly speculative in the case of an individual life. expectancy,
and even more so in the case of a person whose life expectancy has probably
been diminished by his total and permanent disability. When, in addition,
the duty of the insurer is conditioned not only upon the life of the insured,
but upon his continued disability, as it is in disability policies, the measure
of damages is obviously not a matter for mortality tables. The insured might,
however, sue for the accrued payments and for a declaratory judgment
establishing his right to future benefits, 2  or the same result might be
accomplished in the form of an equitable decree.27 In either case provision
21. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 681 (1936).
22. Id. at 680.
23: See Helgar Corp. v. Warner's Features, Inc., 222 N.Y. 449, 453, 119 X.E. 113,
114 (1918).
24. See Kimel v. Mo. State Life Ins. Co., 71 F. (2d) 921, 923 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934).
25. See PATrERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE (1932) 325; Ackerman,
Anticipatory Repudiation and Disability Insurance (1936) 1 NEWARc L. REv. 47.
26. Brix v. People's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 29 P. (2d) 233 (Cal. App. 1934), rcv'd,
37 P. (2d) 448 (Cal. 1934); cf. Bullas v. Empire Life Ins. Co., [1931] 4 D.L.R. 443
(Ont.); Killian v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 251 N.Y. 44, 48, 166 N. E. 798, 800.
Contra: Green v. Inter-Ocean Cas. Co., 203 N. C. 767, 167 S. E. 38 (1932).
27. Cf. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Branham, 250 Ky. 472, 63 S. W. (2d)
498 (1933) ("continuing judgment") ; see Note (1935) 99 A. L. R. 1171, 1177: Acker-
man, supra note 25, at 71. But see Brix v. People's Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 Cal. (2d)
446, 450, 41 P. (2d) 537, 539 (1935). In cases like the instant one, in which the
requirement of jurisdictional amount must be satisfied, it would seem that the maximum
benefits recoverable in the event of a judgment or decree for the plaintiff should govern,
even if the damages as awarded turn out to be a lesser sum than the jurisdictional
amount; for "The amount in controversy is the sum claimed by the plaintiff in his
complaint in good faith where he is entitled to recover that sum, if the evidence sustains
his allegations." 1 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1931)
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should be made for subsequent relitigation of the question of disability.
Shifting the burden of showing a termination of disability to the insurer
upon reopening of the judgment or decree would have the effect of dis-
couraging arbitrary and frequent relitigation by the company.- These
remedies would not preclude an immediate award of past and future bene-
fits where such a course would be warranted, as in a case, for example,
where the insurer "wilfully and contumaciously" harasses the insured. This
solution would seem to be a more practical and equitable one than either
an "acceleration of future benefits", 30 which are necessarily speculative, or
an award simply of the benefits which have accrued at the time of suit, with
the attendant hazard of recurrent litigation in the event of repeated denials
of payments by the insurer.
§429; cf. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 13 F. Supp. 174, 178 (S. D. Te:.
1935).
28. It would also restore the value of the claim of the insured for purposes of
assignment, which may have been materially decreased by the initial repudiation.
29. See Cobb v. Pacific Mlut. Life Ins. Co., 4 Cal. (2d) 565, 574, 51 P. (2d) 84,
88 (1935).
30. N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Viglas, 297 U.S. 672, 682 (1936).
